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as each new field was invaded by crushing machines, as each new hedgerow was 
smashed and uprooted and shattered, as each great oak succumbed before axe and 
dynamite and bulldozer, we felt a pang.  For there is nothing quite as final, quite as 
levelling, as an aerodrome…it was as if a flood had risen and hidden a beautiful 
landscape, and then subsided, leaving a desolate wasteland where there was no life 
and no motion (Robert Arbib, US Airforce)1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction, Methodology, Historiography and Chapter Overview 
 
This dissertation examines the principles, aims and achievements during the Second World 
War of four voluntary organisations committed to protecting Britain’s environment and 
landscape, at a time when they were being significantly damaged and transformed by the 
State’s preparations and support for its war effort in mainland Europe and other parts of the 
world. In what follows, I consider how these organisations balanced that commitment with 
their support for the war effort, and analyse their modus operandi as they negotiated the 
tensions and contradictions that emerged in this period, between the shared imperative to 
prepare and fight for war, and the desire to protect and preserve the country being fought for.  
As I will observe later in this chapter (p.22) this issue has never to my knowledge been 
considered before, and there is an extremely limited historiography both of the role of these 
organisations during the war, and of the domestic impact on the environment and landscape 
of preparation for war to be waged in other territories.  Furthermore, the two of these 
                                                 
1  S. Edwards, ‘Ruins, Relics and Restoration: the afterlife of World War Two, American airfields in England, 
1945-2005,’ pp. 209-228, in C. Pearson, P. Coates, T. Cole, (eds.), Militarized landscapes: from Gettysburg to 
Salisbury Plain (Continuum UK, 2010), p.211 
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organisations that still exist are now both cornerstones of Britain’s conservation culture, yet 
their role in the Second World War has remained virtually unexplored. 
 
This introductory chapter describes and quantifies the nature and level of environmental 
damage and change to the rural landscape caused by the British State’s war effort and 
introduces the organisations under examination: The Council for the Preservation of Rural 
England, the National Trust, the National Smoke Abatement Society, and the Pure Rivers 
Society. The chapter will then outline the dissertation’s research methodology, most 
significantly a qualitative analysis of documents from the four organisations’ archives. It will 
contextualise the research historiographically, engaging with the limited amount of existing 
scholarship on the organisations themselves, with wider historiographies of the environment 
and the Second World War, and with research on war’s impact on the environment more 
broadly. 
 
In investigating how these four organisations balanced their commitment to their aims and 
objectives with support for the war effort, both environmental pollution and changes to the 
rural landscape will be considered.  It should be noted that some pollution and changes to the 
rural landscape were relatively short-term or long-lasting; for example, some requisitioned 
land was returned to its original use before the end of the war;2 other land has remained in use 
by the military, never to be returned to civilian use, and even land that was returned to pre-
war use still bears the scars of pillboxes, as a ramble in the countryside will often attest. 
Further, the identity and values attached to landscapes and buildings can change over time: 
those which at first were regarded as scarred and diminished by the Second World War are 
now with the passage of time seen as having been additionally characterised by and 
                                                 
2  W. Foot, ‘The Impact of the Military on the Agricultural Landscape of England and Wales in the Second 
World War;’ pp.132-142, in B. Short, C. Watkins, J. Martin, (eds.), The Front Line of Freedom (British 
Agricultural History Society, 2007), p.142 
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sometimes even enriched by the war, as evidenced by the National Trust’s focus on some of 
its properties that played a particular role during it.3   
 
For Jacob D Hamblin, the Second World War was a case study in: “the transformation of the 
natural environment under sudden, relatively uncontested, seizure by state power.”4    
 
It is this transformation of the natural environment, and the response of organisations that had 
established themselves to protect it, that is the heart of this dissertation.  The prospect faced 
by Britain when it declared war on Nazi Germany on 3rd September 1939 was not that of a 
five-year war after which the nation would emerge on the victorious side.  The reality at the 
time was that the war would be of indeterminate length, with victory far from assured, and 
the very land that the British people were to be rallied by the State to defend would become a 
resource of the war effort, to be used as needed.  270,687 members of the British armed 
forces and 63,635 British civilians were killed by the Second World War,5 but beyond this 
loss of life, and the material damage by enemy bombing to the built environment in 
predominantly urban areas of Britain, the nation’s war effort in defence of its own shores and 
in support of the defeat of Western European fascism would pose an existential threat to its 
own natural environment.  Three of the four organisations in this dissertation developed war-
time policies for these uncertain times, unclear as to what extent they’d be able to implement 
them before either invasion by Nazi Germany or Allied victory. What they knew however 
was that damage and change had been, was being and would continue to be caused to the 
environment and landscape as a result of the war effort, for an indeterminate period of time 
and with no known ceiling as to how much the environment and the rural landscape would 
                                                 
3 National Trust, ‘Places With Second World War Connections’ (National Trust website) 
4 Jacob D. Hamblin, ‘Environmental Dimensions of World War II’; pp. 698-716 in Thomas W. Zeiler, Daniel 
M. DuBois, (eds.),  A Companion to World War II (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013), p.700 
5 P. Howlett, Fighting With Figures: a statistical digest of the Second World War (Central Statistical Office, 
1995), p.vi 
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need to be changed in support of the war effort.  It is on this basis that the dissertation 
undertakes its analysis. 
 
1.1  The Impact of Preparations For War and the War Effort on the Environment and 
Landscape 
From 1936 onwards, with an increasing probability of a war with Nazi Germany, the armed 
services, particularly the Air Ministry, developed a voracious appetite for land, the latter 
serving 62,000 land requisition notices during the war;6 between 1939 and 1945 landholdings 
of the services increased from 140,000 to 903,000 acres,7 and included 450 new airfields,8 
most requiring hedges and trees to be cut down, ditches and ponds filled in, public footpaths 
severed by new fences, and farm buildings and cottages demolished.   
 
 
 
[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Map of aerodromes in the East of England during the Second World War (the numbers 
indicate the approximate location and density of the airfields)9  
 
                                                 
6 CPRE Quarterly Report, June 1945, Vol. XIV No.4, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), p.4 
7 Short, Freedom, p.39 
8 Ibid, p.134 
9 S.D. Davis, ‘Britain An Island Again: nature, the military and popular views of the British countryside, 
c.1930–1965,’ (G. Kinsey, Aviation: flight over the eastern counties since 1937 (Terrance Dalton Ltd, 1977),  
Fig. 21, inside cover), p.90 
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The vast majority of these airfields were concreted to accommodate heavy bombers, located 
on flat, well-drained land at a low altitude, which very often equated to prime agricultural 
land:10 160 million sq. yards under concrete,11 six inches thick;12 yet many of the airfields 
these aircraft flew from would have an operational life of only 15 to 18 months.13    
 
The coast, mainly around the East and South of England, was hastily protected at the outset 
of war by a “coastal crust”14 of defences which extended several miles inland, including 
28,000 concrete pillboxes and anti-tank emplacements, and hundreds of miles of anti-tank 
ditches, much in farming land.15  By 1944, including land needed for D-Day preparations, 
over 11 million acres, or about 20% of the United Kingdom’s land area, was under some 
form of military control,16 with approximately 9.77 million acres used for battle training, of 
which 4%17 was exclusively occupied by the military and civilian presence was removed.18  
The Minister of Agriculture disclosed in 1945 that 800,000 acres of agricultural land had 
been requisitioned during the war for military purposes.19  “The most flourishing crop seemed 
to be barbed wire,” wrote J.B. Priestley.20   
 
In the drive to reduce its dependence on overseas timber, by 1946 two-thirds of timber 
standing in British woodlands in 1939 had been felled to meet war-time needs,21 with few 
                                                 
10 Foot, Impact, p.135 
11 Ibid, p.134 
12 D. Hart-Davis: Our Land At War: A Portrait of Rural Britain 1939-45 (William Collins, 2015), p.237  
13 Edwards, Ruins, p.211 
14 F. Pryor, The Making of the British Landscape: how we have transformed the land, from prehistory to today, 
(Allen Lane, 2010) p.581 
15 Foot, Impact, p.133 
16 Ibid, p.132 
17 A. Howkins, The Death of Rural England: a social history of the countryside since 1900, (Routledge, 2003), 
p.124 
18 Ibid. (A.W. Foot, ‘The Impact of the Military on the British Farming Landscape in the Second World War,’ 
p.138) 
19 CPRE Quarterly Report, March 1945 Vol XIV, No.3, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), p.6 
20 Foot, Impact, (Norman Longmate (ed.) The Home Front: an anthology of personal experience, 1938-1945, 
Chatto & Windus, 1981, p.57), p.134 
21 E.G.Richards, British Forestry in the 20th Century: policy and achievements (Brill, 2003), p.9 
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mature oaks surviving the war, due to the numerous war-related uses to which they could be 
put.22  Between 1939 and 1945 agricultural land not requisitioned for military use was 
fundamentally and irrevocably transformed in the drive to make Britain more self-sustaining 
in food, with the amount of land farmed for arable purposes in 1939 increasing from 11,810 
thousand acres to 17,866 thousand acres by 1945, and the amount of permanent grassland 
correspondingly falling from 17,638 thousand acres in 1939 to 10,892 by 1945,23 with a 
resulting impact on different types of flora and fauna. 
 
Britain’s industrial war effort produced, amongst many items of war material and military 
hardware: two million rifles,24 8.8 billion rounds of ammunition for guns, 20-mm artillery 
and small arms,25 and 119,479 military aircraft of all types;26 the vast majority had a very 
limited life-span, were designed and manufactured in order to be rapidly expended, with 
much of what was produced not surviving the end of the conflict it was produced for.  The 
war did not however have a monopoly on the industrial production of material with limited 
life-cycles; as Jacob D. Hamblin observes: “war should not be seen as an aberration from 
practices that began before and continued long afterward,”27 but it is a vivid example of how 
natural resources can be rapidly utilised and the natural environment be correspondingly 
diminished when a state embarks on a period of armed conflict with other states. 
 
David Edgerton estimates that perhaps half of all armaments were produced in newly built, 
government owned arms plants or on specialist machines supplied by government,28 requiring 
                                                 
22 H.L. Edlin, Trees, Woods and Man, (Collins, 1966, Second Edition), p.172 
23 E.M. Collingham, Taste of War: World War Two and the battle for food, (Penguin, 2013), p.67 
24 D. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: weapons, resources and experts in the Second World War, (Penguin, 
2012), p.61 
25 Ministry of Information, What Britain Has Done 1939-1945: a selection of outstanding facts and figures, 
(Atlantic Books 2007) , p.107 
26 Howlett, Fighting, p.170 
27 Hamblin, Environmental, p.712 
28 D. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.77 
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a significant number of green or brownfield sites in areas generally outside the range of 
Luftwaffe bombers, predominantly in the North of England and Wales.29  This rapid war-time 
industrialisation in new geographical locations led to instances of increased atmospheric 
pollution,30 as well as increased pollution of waterways31 and the rapid movement of people 
due to evacuation and the establishment of new camps for armed forces strained under-
developed rural and semi-rural sanitation and water supply infrastructure, polluting streams 
and rivers.32   
 
The Manchester Guardian editorialised as early as 1937: “what is the fatal fascination which 
draws our Defence Departments, when they are in search of sites for new depots, nearly 
always to scenes of great beauty or historic interest?”33 and J.B. Priestley wrote: ‘the War 
Office and Air Ministry may need more and more space for encampments, landing grounds, 
ranges and the like, but there is no reason why time after time they should single out some of 
the few unspoilt regions in the country, to ruin them for ever,’34 whilst, most fittingly 
perhaps, it was left to a young soldier writing home from France to the Council for the 
Preservation of Rural England, to articulate most pointedly the dilemma felt most keenly by 
those concerned with the environment: ‘whatever damage might be done by enemy action, he 
and others in the rural conservation movement do not wish to return and find a wilderness of 
our own creating.’35 
 
                                                 
29 Howlett, Fighting, p.86 
30 Manchester Guardian, ‘Polluted Air: More Smoke in War Time,’ 3/4/1940,  p.12  
31 W. Hornby, History of the Second World War: factories and plant, (HMSO/Longmans/ Green & Co., 1958), 
p.115 
32 The Times, ‘River Pollution in War-time’ 2/10/1939; The Times, ‘Pollution of Rivers’ 10/9/1943;  ‘Pure 
Rivers Society statement,’ March 1943 (MERL SR CPRE C /1/54/23) 
33 Manchester Guardian, Editorial: ‘Beauty and the Beast,’ 6/5/1937, p.10 
34 J.B. Priestley, Our Nation’s Heritage (ed.), (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1939), p.168 
35 CPRE Wartime Progress Report, 1939, in CPRE Countryside Campaigner, Autumn 1989, Pt. 1 
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Some voluntary organisations became adept at couching their aims and objectives in a visual 
imagery and rhetoric associated with an idealised rural existence, as part of a trend in art and 
commerce which reached an apogee during the inter-war period. Yet with the onset of war 
these organisations accepted that at least some damage to this rural idyll was a necessity for 
the war effort and the protection of that very identity.  This acceptance of the State’s 
‘transformation of the natural environment’ (p.11 above) in support of the war effort appears 
to have been without hesitation, but these organisations’ support did not however amount to a 
filing away of their mission statements for the duration of the war.  For the most part their 
support did not equate to a lack of analysis of the impact on the environment and landscape 
of the war effort, but the extent to which they challenged the war-time Coalition 
Government’s proposals depended on how central the issue was felt to be to the 
organisations’ concerns (i.e. their “red line” issues), and also differed depending on whether 
they were plans for the conduct of the war or war-time plans for post-war reconstruction; the 
relative capacities of the organisations during war-time was also, inevitably, a significant 
factor.  Moreover, although it was little-recognised or at least inappropriate to acknowledge it 
at the time, for these organisations the war was in some respects organisationally 
advantageous, helping them to achieve certain pre-war objectives which would have stood 
little chance of immediate success without the Second World War; namely, the recognition of 
agricultural land as a strategic utility, and the acquisition and protection of property and 
landscapes of historical and national importance. 
 
This dissertation will inhabit these ironies, paradoxes and contradictions, and answer the 
central research question primarily through exploring the archives of the Campaign for the 
Protection of Rural England (now most commonly known as ‘CPRE’, and during the period 
in question the Council for the Preservation of Rural England), the National Trust (NT), the 
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National Smoke Abatement Society (NSAS), and the Pure Rivers Society (PRS).  I have 
chosen these four organisations because between them they were responsible for addressing 
key environmental issues that Britain’s war effort had an impact on: namely the rural 
environment and landscape, and air and water pollution.  The dissertation will focus on 
environmental impact that was brought about by Britain’s domestic war effort, which as 
noted earlier in this chapter (from p.12) was substantial and widespread.  This dissertation 
will not therefore consider, except in passing, environmental initiatives and concerns that 
existed prior to the war, and were not resolved or achieved until after it, such as the work that 
CPRE and NT were involved in from 1929 onwards to lobby successive governments to 
create national parks.  Further, in deciding to focus on the requisition of land for military 
purposes in the round, and on land which was most prized because of its potential for 
inclusion in national parks, this dissertation will not consider what is, it has to be 
acknowledged, the cause célèbre of land requisitioned by the military, that of the village of 
Tyneham, Dorset, which remained under military control at the end of the war.  Although 
hugely controversial, mainly because the village’s inhabitants had been evicted at the time of 
requisition and never allowed back, the EC papers of both CPRE and NT show that it was not 
a major ongoing issue for either organisation at national level when compared to other 
individual cases they were involved in, nor the wider issue of policy in respect of the return 
of requisitioned land to its original owners and for its original use. 
 
 
1.2  Methodology 
The central research question will be answered through a qualitative analysis of key internal 
and public documents of the afore-mentioned four organisations, particularly Committee and 
Council minutes and private correspondence between 1926 and 1949, and most notably the 
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period 1936 to 1946.  This dissertation proposes defining the period 1936 to 1946 as the 
“long” Second World War, as from 1936 onwards significant requisitioning of rural areas by 
Britain’s Defence Departments (Air Ministry, Army, Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of 
Aircraft Production) took place, and the issue of requisitioned land being returned, or not, to 
its original owners remained a significant issue in the immediate post-war period, and indeed 
for some years after that.   
 
Three of the four organisations were founded between 1926 and 1930: NSAS as a result of a 
merger in 1929, between the Coal Smoke Abatement Society and the Smoke Abatement 
League of Great Britain, with NT being founded thirty years previously in 1895.  The 
dissertation’s methodology will be to identify the environmental threats that led to the 
formation of the organisations, the respective organisations’ founding aims, objectives and 
priorities, and to contrast these with their war-time policies and activities.  The central 
research question is about the balance these organisations struck between their commitment 
to their mission statements and their support for the war effort: the analysis is therefore about 
the who and the why and the what, gauging intentions and actions.  There were no public 
campaigns by these or many other organisations independent of government during the war, 
only those run by the State and its agencies; these organisations operated behind the scenes, 
in private, largely, the primary material would suggest, by letter and in person.  The 
dissertation will therefore be sensitive to the content and style of communications, noting 
language and discourse; it will recognise the importance of key actors, and assess the value of 
links between these individuals and organisations and indeed between these actors and 
individuals operating the levers of government.   
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Primarily, EC-level minutes and press articles will be analysed to identify the different types 
of threat to the environment from 1936 until the outbreak of war as a result of the increasing 
territorial demands being made by Defence Departments during this peace-time period, and 
the evolution of CPRE and NT’s response to these demands, at a time when the prospect of 
war was for much of this time still not assured.  The dissertation will then consider in 
summary war-time emergency legislation that was enacted at the outbreak of war, as this 
provides the operating context for the four organisations during the war, and their respective 
EC papers and public statements will be analysed to identify their war-time policies and 
programmes of work.  The dissertation will, within the 1939-1945 long series of archival 
material, seek to identify several different patterns of behaviour: firstly, support for the war-
effort where there was a convergence of interests, most notably CPRE and NT’s support for 
the ‘Recording Britain’ project.  Secondly, the area of acquiescence, such as PRS and the 
issue of inland water pollution, and CPRE and NT in the case of open-cast coal mining and 
the felling of the country’s woodlands for timber.  Thirdly, the dissertation will identify what 
issues the organisations were unequivocally opposed to the Coalition Government on, such as 
in CPRE’s case the location of industry in rural areas which were earmarked for national park 
status, and the conditions attached to the return of requisitioned land to its original owners 
and usage; further, for NSAS, the Ministry of Home Security’s decision in 1940 to instruct 
selected industrial sites around Britain to deliberately produce more smoke from their 
industrial processes in order to obscure targets from Luftwaffe bombing raids.   
 
Having explored the validity of the qualitative approach that the dissertation will be using, it 
is also important to consider why an alternative, quantitative approach is not appropriate.  
Looking at the subject quantitatively would, I argue, be more suited to addressing the 
organisations’ success in limiting environmental damage during the war.  This approach 
20 
 
would in any case be problematic and necessarily partial, given that discussions and 
outcomes within the CPRE and NT about specific sites required by Defence Departments 
occurred in-camera and were not minuted by them.  Such a quantitative approach would also 
be problematic because it is not possible to consider the four organisations to an equal depth 
for several reasons (indeed, even for a qualitative approach this provides challenges, although 
not insurmountable ones).  Firstly, there are significant gaps in the material available; whilst 
EC-level papers, showing agenda items, key contextual information, and decisions, survive 
across the organisations, no supporting documentation that the committees would have 
considered in their meetings has survived, and in the case of NSAS and PRS, no sub-
committee papers have survived at all (most frustratingly the PRS’ Pollution Sub-Committee 
reports to its EC), probably because these two organisations merged or amalgamated with 
other organisations, with inevitably a corresponding filtering process being undertaken at 
some point as to the future relevance of historical material.  Secondly, in the case of PRS 
specifically, at its EC meeting of 20th April 1939, in a measure destined to make future 
archivists weep, the Secretary reported that:  
 
…the filing cabinets were choked with correspondence since the inception of the 
Society and there was an immense mass of other out-of-date papers which were in 
almost inextricable confusion…it was resolved…to go through the papers…and 
destroy all not required. There was a general consensus of opinion that excepting 
possibly in special cases there was no need to keep anything more than two or three 
years old.36 
 
                                                 
36 PRS EC Minutes 20/4/1939, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.108  
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Thirdly, governance structures, decision making, and minute-taking were to a considerable 
extent streamlined across all four organisations in the war-time period, due to a combination 
of a lack of available committee members and supporting staff as a result of them serving 
directly in support of the war effort, the lack of safe meeting places in London and logistical 
problems with travelling to alternative temporary headquarters in the Home Counties, and a 
lack of paper.   
 
That said, a substantial body of archival material survives.  In the case of CPRE at its 
headquarters in South London, and at the Museum of English Rural Life (MERL), University 
of Reading; the National Trust’s archives are held at its Headquarters in Swindon, and 
selected surviving NSAS documents and publications are held in The Wellcome Library’s 
Archives and Manuscripts Department in London, with the remaining PRS archive at its 
(twice-removed) successor organisation, Fish Legal, in Leominster, Herefordshire.  I am 
complementing this documentation with a consideration of a number of British press articles 
from the 1936 to 1946 period, and a wide range of secondary sources.  
 
The concluding chapters will touch on legacy issues (using CPRE as an illustration) namely 
how organisations’ “long” war-time activities influenced their post-war development, and 
what status this activity has within the institutional history of the organisation, and beyond 
that, the resonance of this study beyond the specific historical period that it is analysing.  
Primary sources used for this will be an interview conducted by the dissertation author with a 
senior member of CPRE staff and unpublished transcripts of senior CPRE honorary officers 
and staff from the post-war period. 
 
1.3  Historiography 
22 
 
Firstly, the historiography of terminology:  P. Mandler argues the term “environment” did not 
come into “non-technical currency” until the early 1960s,37 but for the purposes of this 
dissertation this term will be retrospectively applied to the four organisations considered by 
this dissertation, partly for convenience, but also because the organisations displayed a degree 
of environmental awareness in the inter-war period which would not be out of place in the 
period Mandler addresses.  For example, NSAS refers to promoting and supporting 
legislation “for preventing the pollution of the atmosphere” in its Objects, as stated in its First 
Annual Report of 1930,38 even though the issue of smoke abatement was mostly associated 
with public health during this period, and at the height of the Second World War, the NSAS 
again, thundered that the period may be judged to be “a barbarous age…[one of]…reckless 
squandering of limited natural resources;”39 a rhetorical flourish that could easily have been 
made by Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace in the 1970s. 
 
This dissertation’s consideration of the historiography associated with the central research 
question covers two linked but distinct areas: firstly, the historiography associated with the 
four organisations that are the focus of this dissertation, particularly during the long Second 
World War period, and secondly, the historiography of the environment and war.  Looking at 
Britain’s Second World War through the prism of Environmental History both enables the 
utilisation of previously unconsidered sources and attaches a significance to facts which 
previously have been ignored.  For example, the analysis of Neville Chamberlain’s place in 
history, either by the political biographer or the military historian, is so dominated by the so-
called Munich Agreement, his “peace for our time”40 reassurance to the nation, and being 
misled by Hitler as to the latter’s imperialist intentions, that Chamberlain as appeaser-dupe, 
                                                 
37 P. Mandler, The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home, (Yale University Press, 1997), p.390 
38 NSAS First Annual Report 1930, (WL SA/EPU/E/1/1), p.4 
39 NSAS Twelfth Annual Report 1942 , (WL SA/EPU/E/1/1), p.10 
40 Britannia Historical Documents: sources of British History (online resource) 
23 
 
together with the heroic retreat from Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain’s glorious few, and 
Churchill as the nation’s saviour, have entered English folklore as the cornerstones of 
understanding Britain’s Second World War experience until the United States and Soviet 
Union joined the war.  This dissertation, in investigating an aspect of the environmental 
history of the Second World War, has through interrogating the archives of CPRE and press 
reports on domestic environmental issues, unearthed material not found by the majority of 
conventional political biographies of Chamberlain and histories of the war, or at least utilised 
it where other historical works have found it but not judged it relevant to refer to it.  In what I 
would hope is a representative cross-section of Chamberlain biographies exploring his life, 
political career and role in the Second World War, by N. Smart,41 William R. Rock,42 H 
Montgomery Hyde,43 K. Feiling,44 and R. Self,45 none make any reference whatsoever to 
CPRE or the Government department-wide consultative mechanism Chamberlain set up in 
early 1938 (unparalleled then and possibly since between a government on a war footing and 
civil society) to provide CPRE with a means through which to engage with war-effort related 
Government departments over their needs for land.  This when Chamberlain had so many 
demands on his time with international efforts to avoid war and domestic political turbulence.  
Quoting from Self: “after he returned to London…[after Parliament’s winter recess]…he 
almost immediately found himself in ‘the thick of a tangle of problems.’46 This dissertation 
broadens the understanding of Chamberlain’s political contribution during these last years of 
the inter-war period, beyond the parameters of the above biographies.   
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Further, this dissertation’s consideration of the historical record from an environmental 
history perspective, in looking at the increasing amounts of land that was being requisitioned 
by the Defence Departments in the three years prior to Britain declaring war, shows that 
Chamberlain was as Prime Minister presiding over significant degrees of preparation for war 
despite still doing all in his power to seek a reasonable peace.  More detailed investigations of 
this issue, beyond the scope of this dissertation, could shed further light on the extent to 
which Chamberlain’s administration was preparing for war, and could potentially lead to an 
at least partial reappraisal of Chamberlain’s place in Second World War historiography. 
 
With regard to the organisations that this dissertation will be focusing on, there is an almost 
complete historiographical deficit in relation to the policies and activities of British voluntary 
organisations concerned with the environment and the rural landscape during the Second 
World War, most notably, where this dissertation is concerned, CPRE, NT, NSAS and PRS.  
The closest any book or journal article comes to a consideration of these organisations’ roles 
is the ‘A Countryside Worth Fighting For’ chapter in CPRE’s own ‘22 Ideas That Saved the 
English Countryside,’47 although with due respect to the authors, a former CPRE Chairman 
and the current Senior Communications and Information Officer at CPRE, from an academic 
standpoint this cannot count as an independent, objective analysis.  The only published 
assessment I have to date found on the level of war-time activity of the above four 
organisations has been a passing reference by A.F. Wilt in Food For War: Agriculture and 
Rearmament in Britain Before the Second World War, who states that CPRE ‘continued to 
comment on the government’s acquisition of land for military installations, but…[was]… less 
active during the war than before it.’48  This dissertation will show this assertion to be so 
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blunt and lacking in context as to be misleading, and further, it assumes that the only action 
CPRE took was of a public nature, whereas correspondence held in CPRE archives at MERL, 
which will be referred to throughout Chapters Three and Four below, show that CPRE made 
extensive use of its private back-channels to Government Ministries throughout the war, 
utilising the informal mechanisms and goodwill provided by its supporters in the Commons, 
Lords and senior figures in the civil service. 
 
With regard to the other three organisations that this dissertation covers, only the National 
Trust is served with biographies, in particular by P. Weideger,49 J. Gaze,50 and M. 
Waterson,51 although in the case of the latter two, the Trust was involved as publisher, so 
they must be regarded somewhat as “authorised” biographies.  NSAS war-time activities are 
examined briefly by P. Thorsheim,52 and indeed this is the only academic text that, albeit 
briefly, considers the war-time position and programme of work of any of the four 
organisations, with reference to the NSAS’ publications and meetings.  Lastly, there is no 
trace of PRS at all in academic texts, except for J. Hassan’s reference to the organisation as 
‘elusive;’53 this may be because its archive was believed to be lost, until my research for this 
dissertation uncovered it recently catalogued, located at its twice-removed successor 
organisation, Fish Legal. 
 
This dissertation disputes the critical assessments of CPRE that exist within the limited 
historiography of voluntary sector organisations concerned with environmental issues in the 
inter-war period.  In favourably contrasting British nature conservation  of the 1960s with 
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that of the inter-war period,  Hassan asserts that the pre-1940 years were characterised by 
“preservationism”54 and “backward-looking environmentalism,”55 yet in the case of CPRE 
(they and the National Trust being the key inter-war period nature conservation bodies), from 
CPRE’s outset a major plank of its philosophy and policy embraced change and perceived 
development with Professor Patrick Abercrombie, one of its founders and major influences, 
writing on the eve of CPRE being founded,  that:  
 
new, more advanced or more intensive methods of farming…[are]…to be 
encouraged…[and]…it may become more economical to work fields in larger units, 
entailing the removal of hedges and trees.56 
 
This would be a factor of fundamental importance in the CPRE’s war-time policy, both with 
regard to the transformation of agricultural land from pastoral to arable use, and with regard 
to the requisitioning of land with an agricultural use by the military. 
 
Elsewhere, P. Mandler considers that “even in the 1930s…[CPRE]…was still regarded by 
most politicians and civil servants as a gang of cranks beneath notice.”57 Yet CPRE was well-
connected to the political establishment.  As noted above (p.23) Neville Chamberlain, as 
Prime Minister, in response to lobbying by CPRE in February 1938, required his government 
departments to establish mechanisms to liaise with CPRE on an ongoing basis regarding its 
concerns over the requisitioning of land, by the Defence Departments in particular.58  Further, 
in CPRE’s 1938 Annual Report, issued in 1939, the CPRE reported that it used the 
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“Parliamentary Amenities Group to raise issues relating to housing, coastal amenities, land 
acquisition and use by Defence Departments;59 Furthermore, in 1939 correspondence, the 
Amenities Group had actually approached both CPRE and NT for suggestions regarding 
Private Members Bills that the Group could initiate;60 the Group consisted, CPRE assessed, 
of 18 active MPs and five lords, and a further 11 MPs and six lords who could be called on to 
act.61 Lastly, G.L. Pepler was a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Health and a member of 
CPRE’s EC from its inception, and H.G. Strauss, an associate member of CPRE, would 
become Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Town and Country Planning in 1943 
when the new Ministry was created.62    
 
Hilton and McKay,63 and Hilton, Crewson, Mouhot and McKay,64 identify key features of the 
voluntary organisations that emerged in Britain in the Twentieth Century, and therefore help 
establish CPRE, NT, NSAS and PRS within wider British civil society, particularly with 
regard to the organisational size and socio-economic background of their members and 
supporters, compared to other voluntary organisations in the inter-war period.  P. Grant’s 
‘Voluntarism and the Impact of the First World War,’ in The Ages of Voluntarism65 identifies 
two particular organisational phenomena; firstly mutual aid organisations for working people, 
such as trade unions and the developing labour movement had increased from under two 
million in 1900 to four million by 1914 and would reach eight million by 1920;66 and 
secondly the increasing presence of the ‘respectable’ working class in voluntary 
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organisations, particularly women,67 most notably in organisations concerned with poverty 
and philanthropy.68  This is emphasised by the numbers involved, with the Mothers’ Union 
having a membership of 538,000, and the National Federation of Women’s Institute 238,000 
by the 1930s.69  
 
J. Sheail’s Nature in Trust,70 Rural Conservation in Inter-War Britain71 and Nature 
Conservation in Britain72 help create a sense of place for CPRE, National Trust, NSAS and 
PRS, in relation to the sub-set of “amenity societies,”73 that is to say voluntary organisations 
which demonstrated their direct appreciation of the countryside through their members’ 
engagement in outdoor activities.  Sheail records that the Federation of Rambling Clubs had 
40,000 members by 1931,74 and the Youth Hostel Association 83,000 members by the 
outbreak of the Second World War.75 
 
In comparison to these amenity societies and other civil society organisations, the 
memberships of CPRE, NT, NSAS and PRS were tiny, and this larger amenity-focused 
potential constituency of support was a key reason why the CPRE and the Trust in particular 
started to associate themselves with the amenity societies from the late 1920s onwards.76 NT 
membership was just 2,000 in 1930 and only reached just under 8,000 by 1939;77 available 
archive material from NSAS and PRS refer to subscription income rather than members, but 
in both cases individual membership was extremely small, with NSAS recording just £1,200 
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p.a. at the outbreak of war,78 and PRS’ cash statement for the year ended 1938 recorded 
subscriptions and donations of just £139 pounds, 6 shillings, and 6 pence.79 CPRE’s Twelfth 
Annual Report of 1938 recorded that it had 38 country branches and county committees, 44 
constituent bodies, 152 affiliated bodies, and an ‘ever increasing’ associate membership.80  
Looking at membership numbers does however provide only a very partial understanding of 
the significance of these organisations, as in contrast to many of the afore-mentioned 
elements of civil and amenity society, these four organisations were dominated by well-
connected well-educated middle-to-upper-class men, many professionally qualified in the 
issues which formed the basis of their organisations’ concerns.  CPRE’s support manifested 
itself mainly in the inter-war period through its structure of affiliated organisations, amongst 
these, and also as individual members, was ‘the articulate support of a body of intellectuals 
who wrote vigorously in defence of the countryside.’81  Similarly in NSAS’ case their success 
could not be measured by its individual membership, but the extent of the Society’s inroads 
into the network of local authority medical officers around the country.  The NT would only 
slowly modernise during the inter-war period, but for much of this time the Trust was what 
SimonThurley describes as a “posh pressure group…[run by]…a small number of 
establishment figures with the wealth and connections that allowed them to press their 
case…[meeting in]… the Palace of Westminster, the Inns of Court, and in aristocratic town 
houses.”82  
 
Another relevant historiography is that of landscape and national identity; a key text that 
explores this relationship, particularly with regard to voluntary organisations concerned with 
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the environment, is D. Matless’ Landscape and Englishness, in which he describes the 
appropriation, by a range of vested interests, including civil society, of land, particularly rural 
land, as, a ‘national symbol.’83 This idealisation, or I would suggest, nation-alisation of land, 
was a product firstly of disillusion with industrialisation and urbanisation, and then as the 
aforementioned ‘national symbol,’ a motivational tool which could be used to generate 
support for civil society objectives and be appropriated by the State to generate support for 
the war effort.  The issue is also explored across works by Loweson,84 Weight,85 Weiner,86 
and Mandler (above, pages 22 and 26).  A. Carey observes: ‘propaganda material from both 
the First and Second World Wars mobilised this ideal to inspire the patriotism required to 
save the nation it stood for…the topographical and nationalistic meanings of the word 
“country” collapsed into one another.’87  Chapter Two, below, engages with this issue 
through exploring some of CPRE’s communications work between its inception in 1926 and 
the outbreak of the war. 
 
Although the war-time positions and work programmes of the four organisations at the centre 
of this dissertation have not to date therefore been addressed comprehensively nor necessarily 
fairly by academic inquiry, it must not be assumed from this that there is no war-time 
historiography of other elements of Britain’s voluntary sector concerned with environmental 
issues.  It is ironic that possibly the best war-time assessment is of an organisation that did 
not actually exist; Phillip Cornford’s examination88 of the organic movement’s origins 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the movement’s total failure to influence the 
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Government’s war-time agricultural policy, although there was not an actual organisation 
promoting organic values and opposing the industrialisation of agriculture until the Soil 
Association was founded in 1946.   
 
With the exception of Thorsheim’s few pages on smoke during war-time Britain [see above 
page reference], there is also a lack of a historiography relating to air and water pollution in 
Britain during the Second World War, and the loss of land to war-time industrialisation, 
although there is a significant amount of material on military airfields, such as Patrick Otter’s 
books on Lincolnshire and Yorkshire Second World War airfields,89 and Graham Smith’s 
books on Norfolk and Suffolk airfields,90 albeit from a military rather than environmental 
perspective.  More recently there has been a move towards exploring other aspects of the war, 
more on what could be referred to as the “Home Front,” by Laura Dawes,91 the afore-
mentioned Britain’s War Machine,92 examining the resources Britain had at its disposal to 
wage the Second World War, and a number of books on aspects of war-time agriculture, by 
the afore-mentioned Collingham93 (p.14) and Wilt94 (p.24).   
 
The historiography of the environment and war is generally not conclusive about when the 
subject came of academic interest.  C.D, Stone, writing in 2000, suggests that environmental 
damage from all causes in the post-war period, together with environmentalism, ‘have forced 
us to reconsider our posture towards the environment in wartime.’95  J.H. Hamblin, writing in 
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2013, acknowledges that ‘World War II…entailed the mobilisation of natural resources on an 
unprecedented scale’96 and raises the prospect of finding the roots of contemporary 
environmental science and social thought during the war itself as opposed to the more 
commonly identified period as the 1960s, but then, having whet our appetite, states that 
‘…the present chapter attempts no comprehensive answer to these questions…’97 and goes on 
to provide a compendium of other academics’ work which also does not answer the 
tantalising question Hamblin poses.  In contrast, Jennifer Leaning, writing in 1993, observes: 
‘the effect of war on the environment, as a general topic, has not received equivalent 
attention, and what notice it has attracted has arisen only recently,’98 and she attaches a point 
in time to this as after the Gulf War of 1991,99 predominantly because of the war being 
‘remarkable for the extent of the environmental damage wrought in such a brief time 
frame.’100  Perhaps this is true for academia, but the United Nations Environment Programme 
was already addressing the subject: in 1988 A.H. Westing recognised that whilst: ‘natural 
resources are consumed in large quantities in the preparation and pursuit of wars,’101  
‘…methods and means of warfare did not really place the doing of such damage to the natural 
environment within the reach of belligerents until World War II…’102…[and] ‘…the making 
of war before 1945 did not find the effects of war on the natural environment to constitute an 
urgent problem.’103 Clearly, by specific reference to “belligerents” the emphasis is on the 
territories that are battlegrounds, and in “before 1945,” Westing seeks to draw a dividing line 
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between environmental damage in the pre and post-atomic ages.  That there would also 
appear to have been no “urgent problem” for the natural environment as a result of pre-1945 
warfare would suggest a very limited consideration of the impact of war caused by a 
country’s own war effort. 
 
Both Leaning and Westing limit their overall consideration of environmental damage to that 
generated by military forces in the conflict zone, and the environmental price that the 
vanquished may pay for an aggressor waging war on its own territory; this represents a 
militarily and geographically defined interpretation of environmental history and this 
dissertation will depart from it.  In doing so it will establish common cause with a small but 
significant body of work which: ‘extends understanding of military environments beyond 
battlefields to home territories,’104 in particular work by Peter Coates and Marianna Dudley 
of the Environmental Humanities cluster within the Department of History at the University 
of Bristol; mention should in this context also be made of the already cited Hart-Davis’ Our 
Land At War (above, p.13), which explores the impact of the war on British rural life as well 
as on aspects of the environment and landscape.  This dissertation builds on their work, 
looking at a broader range of historical environmental impact on these “home territories” as a 
result of the Second World War effort; the dissertation also adds to the “Home Front” 
literature referred to above (p.31).  There are in the same respect several other significant 
historiographical themes where the dissertation adds to existing material: this study expands 
on the understanding generated by Edgerton’s focus on Britain’s industrial capacity in the 
previously mentioned Warfare State (above, p.15) and Britain’s War Machine, (already cited 
above, p.14) by bringing an environmental sensibility to the subject of war-time industry, and 
similarly to the books on Second World War airfields (p.31 above).  Lastly, this study 
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complements and adds to the existing work done on those elements of civil society with 
environmental interests done by Cornfield and Thorsheim on the organic movement (p.58 
below) and NSAS (p.25 above), together with the various biographies of the National Trust 
(p.25 above) and CPRE’s own informal autobiography, (p.24 above).  
 
All of the above represents a substantial contextual historiographical hinterland to this 
dissertation’s central research question, but there is almost no specific description or analysis 
of the war-time attitudes and policies of organisations concerned with the environment. 
Ultimately, therefore, this dissertation explores new academic territory, centred around 
environmental organisations’ support for a war-effort which in some instances caused 
permanent or at least long-lasting damage to Britain’s environment and landscape, but which 
also, paradoxically, proved organisationally beneficial for at least some of the same 
organisations.  
 
The question must be asked therefore, why historians have not written to any significant 
extent about the work of environmental organisations during the Second World War?  
Possibly, if some have taken Wilt’s line in respect of CPRE (above p.24) then they would 
have felt there was little of substance to interrogate, or if they had paid undue importance to 
Mandler’s “cranks” assertion (p.26 above), that the organisations lacked the necessary 
influence to be historically important.  Or perhaps a feeling prevailed amongst some that the 
war-time role of civil society organisations and their engagement with Defence Departments 
was in some way the preserve of military historians?  Or perhaps the incomplete archives of 
some of the organisations has been off-putting (p.20 above)?  Another reason could be that 
there is no easily accessible source of material; the four organisations worked increasingly 
privately in the run up to and during the war, using back-channels, and referring only in 
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passing fashion to agenda items which must have been discussed at length but for reasons of 
security were not minuted; not obvious territory for an historian perhaps.  All of these 
possible explanations are of course not mutually exclusive.  This dissertation will hopefully 
fill the void that exists both in relation to the historiography of these environmental 
organisations and the ‘Home Front’ during the Second World War.  There is also a significant 
amount of information available which whilst not directly relevant to answering the central 
research question, nevertheless deserves to see the light of day.  Perhaps this dissertation may 
serve to open up the war-time history of these organisations to further serious inquiry. 
 
1.4  Chapter Overview 
Following this initial chapter which introduces the central research question, defines the 
subject of war-time environmental damage and change to the rural landscape, and establishes 
the historiography surrounding the dissertation and the methodology it will follow.  Chapter 
Two discusses the inter-war environmental context for the establishment of the organisations 
under examination here.  It considers the main threats to the environment and rural landscape 
between 1919 and 1936, and establishes the aims and objectives of the organisations and their 
underpinning social and ideological motivations. 
 
Chapter Three introduces the concept of the ‘Long Second World War’ covering the period 
1936 to 1946, recognising that the impact on the environment and landscape pre-dated the 
formal outbreak of war and reflects the activities of the Government’s Defence Departments 
and the response of CPRE and NT in particular.  As a consequence this chapter will show that 
these organisations’ respective positions towards the war effort were to a great extent 
determined before the actual outbreak of war, and that during the initial 1936 to 1938 period 
a key consultative mechanism was established with the Government which would provide a 
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working framework for dialogue between CPRE, NT and the Government for much of the 
duration of the war.  
 
Chapter Four will focus on the decisions and activities of CPRE, NT, NSAS and PRS with 
regard to how they responded to the impact of the war-time war effort; it will identify what 
their attitudes were to the war, look at the decision making processes that the respective 
organisations undertook regarding continuing their work during war-time, and what their 
priorities were, and were not, how they perceived their own roles and what mechanisms they 
chose, or were available to them, to engage with the State.  The analysis will be framed in 
terms of where there was a convergence of interests between any of the organisations and the 
Coalition Government, where there was acquiescence by the organisations in the face of 
known environmental damage and enforced change to the landscape, and where there was 
outright or at least significant degrees of opposition to State intentions regarding how to 
conduct the war effort. 
 
In the next, fifth chapter, the issue of “legacy” will be addressed briefly, using the example of 
CPRE to explore to what extent an organisation’s war-time policies and activities may have 
had influence on the organisation’s further and future development and therefore represented 
a particularly distinct or notable part of its institutional history, or indeed to the broader field 
of environmental history.  
 
The final chapter will identify the conclusions that can be drawn from addressing the central 
research question, and identify the potential for further historical inquiry. 
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The public life of England….was sustained by a great army of busybodies, and 
anyone could enlist in this army who felt inclined to…these were the active people of 
England and provided the ground swell of her history.1  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Inter-War Period: issues and organisations 
 
This chapter discusses the inter-war context for the establishment of the organisations under 
examination here. It considers the main threats to the environment from 1919 to 1936 when, 
as I have argued (p.18 above), Britain’s “long” Second World War began, and the absence of 
action by the State to address these threats. The chapter offers a historical context for the 
organisations’ efforts to balance their commitment to protect the environment with their 
support for the Second World War effort, and it establishes their aims and objectives and 
motivations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, (Pelican 1979), p.230 
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2.1  The Legacy of the First World War Effort and the State of the Environment in Inter-War 
Britain 
To bolster the general public’s support for the war, the British Government disseminated 
visual propaganda such as this Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’s 1915 poster: 
 
 
[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
 
 
    Fig. 2 © IWM (Art.IWM PST 0320); unknown artist 
 
Putting aside the incongruity of a kilt-wearing soldier standing guard over English thatched 
cottages, presumably aimed at encouraging a Scottish audience to fight for an English 
countryside, the merging of nationalistic and topographical meanings of the word “country”2 
encouraged the general public to identify with this post-enclosure rural landscape as 
something that was part of their own identity, even if the reality at the time was that they  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Carey, This Land, p.80 
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might only rarely visit it and for practical or financial reasons could not hope to live in it.  
This propaganda was to create a hostage to fortune in the inter-war period, as new or re-
energised voluntary organisations, opinion formers and the media came to recognise that the 
State and private sector seemed to have none of the special regard for the country’s landscape 
in the post-First World War period that the public had been implored to identify with.  S. 
Davis observes: 
 
First World War propaganda had positioned the rural landscape as the essential 
England: the England being fought for. There emerged afterwards an unprecedented 
interest in the English countryside, which different groups fought for their rights to 
use and view.3 
 
This “unprecedented interest” could also deploy visual propaganda in support of its cause, for 
example the Punch cartoon, on the next page, reproduced in Clough Williams-Ellis’ (a senior 
figure in CPRE Wales) propagandist pro-environment England and the Octopus in 1928: 
[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
 Fig. 3
4 
This sense of post-First World War disappointment, and even perhaps betrayal, would in due 
course make the four organisations in this dissertation particularly sensitive to the issue of 
post-war reconstruction during the Second World War, and would have a significant 
influence on the extent to which they would oppose the State during the war with regard to 
the terms under which the war-effort damaged environment and landscape was restored once 
the war was over.   
                                                 
3 Davis, Britain, p.184 
4 Matless, Landscape, p.44 
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The next part of this chapter will identify the significant environmental problems that existed 
in the inter-war period and the inadequate response from the State, both of which led to the 
founding of CPRE, NSAS and PRS.  The National Trust, the only one of the four 
organisations founded before the inter-war period, is considered in relation to CPRE, as a 
founding and constituent member of that organisation.  
 
2.2  Air Pollution and the National Smoke Abatement Society 
In 1921 a Departmental Committee report of the Ministry of Health, which held what we 
would understand to be the environmental brief for the government, estimated that there was 
an annual discharge of three million tons of soot from the burning of coal.  The Royal 
Commission on the Coal Industry in 1926 estimated that this was the equivalent in weight to 
nearly three days’ output  of all the then collieries in Britain, or to put it another way, ‘the 
work of over one million men for three days every year is devoted to providing soot which 
pollutes our atmosphere.’5 As a response to Britain’s air pollution problem the NSAS was 
formed in 1929 out of the amalgamation of the Coal Smoke Abatement Society and the 
Smoke Abatement League of Great Britain.  Its objectives were to create informed public 
opinion ‘on the evils of air pollution,’6 to contribute to the abolition of industrially and 
domestically produced smoke through the popularisation of smokeless methods of heat and 
power production, and to promote and support legislation for preventing the pollution of the 
atmosphere.7  Local council Medical Officers made a ready constituency for NSAS and its 
predecessor bodies.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Daily  Telegraph, ‘Wasted in Smoke,’ 12/5/1942, p. 4. 
6 NSAS First Annual Report, 1930, p.4 
7 Ibid. 
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2.3  Water Pollution and the Pure Rivers Society 
During the inter-war period, industrial and agricultural processes and domestic sewage were 
all factors in the pollution of Britain’s inland waters; H.D Turing comments that ‘…the 
cumulative consequences of industrialisation imposed great strain on rivers…as river bacteria 
deals with factory wastes less effectively than with domestic effluent.’8  In 1936 the Trent 
Fishery Board found that out of 550 miles of the River Trent and its tributaries, a quarter of 
its length was lethal to all animal and plant life, and for 30 miles in and below the Potteries it 
was a dead river.9  Hassan observes however that trends were not uniform, as rivers 
recovered in between industrialised towns and in some regions river quality did improve;10 in 
the round however, he concludes that: ‘the inter-war years were not positive ones for the 
condition of the country’s inland waters…the economic depression of the early 1930s were 
years when sewage treatment and river conservation received the lowest priority.’11   
 
In response to this combination of factors, in October 1926 an inaugural meeting of parties 
interested in taking action was held, and the first annual meeting of PRS occurred in 1928.12  
Given there is scant surviving documentation of PRS, the organisation’s first Annual Report 
rather unhelpfully states that “it is unnecessary to enter into any justification for the existence 
of the Pure Rivers Society,”13 although subsequently it was more forthcoming, stating that its 
aims included checking and reducing: ‘the most serious and ever steadily increasing pollution 
of our rivers and seas from sewage, factory effluents,’ and its objectives included setting up a 
                                                 
8 Hassan, History (H.D. Turing; River Pollution; Edward Arnold, p.40), p.69 
9 B.W. Clapp, An Environmental History of Britain Since the Industrial Revolution (Longman 1994), p.89 
10 Hassan, History, p.66 
11 Ibid. 
12 The First Annual of the Pure Rivers Society 1930, (FL PRS 2/1/1), p.3 
13 Ibid, p.2 
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central and advisory body to bring together all anti-pollution forces, and to ‘agitate steadily 
and consistently for effective legislation for the prevention and cure of pollution.’14    
 
PRS would remain in the years after its inception a small organisation compared with the 
other three organisations considered here; for example, the EC minutes of 17th June 1937 
record that: ‘owing to the absence on vacation of the Pollution Sub-Committee there were no 
Pollution Reports for confirmation by the meeting.’15  However, PRS did potentially have a 
sizeable constituency of support to call on in the context of the health of fisheries, which 
concerned the 600,000 members of the National Working Mens’ Anglers Association16 and 
landowners who had a strong commercial interest in maintaining healthy freshwater 
fisheries.17  
 
2.4  The Rural Environment, Landscape, CPRE and the National Trust 
Land ownership was subject to a severe state of flux after the First World War; one quarter of 
Britain’s land surface changed hands between 1918 and 1922,18 as a result of new forms of 
taxation breaking up country estates and the loss of officer-class sons of the gentry during the 
First World War who might otherwise have resisted their estates’ demise. H. Newby 
considers that this transfer of property ownership was greater than ‘at any time since the 
dissolution of the monasteries.’19  A lack of planning controls meant that almost any land 
suitable for building could be sold, no matter its agricultural quality and the use to which it 
was to be put.20  This would prove highly significant with the onset of the inter-war economic 
                                                 
14 PRS Annual Report 1937, (FL PRS 1/2/1-10), p.12 
15 PRS EC Minutes, 17/6/1937, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.63 
16 Hassan, History, (M. Shortland  (ed.), Science and Nature: Essays in the History of the environmental 
Sciences; (Alden Press for the British Society for the History of Sciences), p.43), p.82 
17 Ibid. 
18 C. Bailey, ‘Progress and Preservation: the role of rural industries in the making of the modern image of the 
countryside,’ Journal of Design History, (Vol.9, No.1 (1996), pp. 35-53), p.36 
19 Ibid, (H. Newby, Country Life: A social history of rural England, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.153 )   
20 Sheail, Rural Conservation, p.25 
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depression, which brought a decline in farm prices of over one-third,21 and a move by farmers 
to less costly forms of agriculture, from arable to pasture, or the sale of their land; between 
1918 and 1939 the amount of arable farming declined by four million acres,22 and over a 
million acres passed out of agricultural use across Britain completely.23   Between 1927 and 
1934 farmers sold 64,800 acres to the Air Ministry,24 but the greatest loss of land in rural 
areas was to housebuilding.  J.Sheail advises that no precise record was kept of the amount of 
land converted to residential use, but refers to estimates of about 38,000 acres of land being 
developed each year for housing between 1927/8 and 1933/4, rising to 50,000 acres p.a. 
1934/5 to 1938/9.25  L. Dudley Stamp, the noted British geographer, drily observed of the 
inter-war period that “for many farmers, the only profitable crop was a crop of bungalows.”26 
 
It was in this context that an inaugural meeting convened by the President of the Royal 
Institute of British Architects, was held on the 2nd March 1926, for those ‘interested in the 
Preservation of Rural England.’27  Within the year, the Council for the Preservation of Rural 
England was formed, with the aim of seeking to coordinate the activities of a number of 
previously disparate and distinct voluntary bodies and societies.  Its objects, reported in its 
first Annual Report of 1927,28 were to: ‘…organise concerted action to secure the protection 
of rural scenery…act either directly or through its members …[and] …arouse, form and 
educate public opinion.’29 
 
                                                 
21 S.Ward, War in the Countryside 1939-45, (David & Charles, 1988), p.10 
22 Sheail, Rural Conservation, p.23 
23 L. D. Stamp, The Land of Britain: its use and misuse; Longmans (1962 edition), p.439 
24 I.G. Simmons, An Environmental History of Great Britain: from 10,000 years ago to the present, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2001), p.218 
25 Sheail, Rural Conservation, p.9 
26 Stamp, The Land, p.404 
27 CPRE Session 1925-26, (MERL SR CPRE A/1), p.1 
28 CPRE Annual Report 1927, (MERL SR CPRE B/1/1) 
29 Ibid. 
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A range of organisations became constituent members of CPRE’s governing Council, 
including NT.  In recognition of the rationale for CPRE’s creation, The Times summed up the 
current fractured nature of the response to the environmental threat when it noted on the eve 
of the organisation’s formation:  
 
…patchwork protection, the saving of a hill here and a lake there, of a handful of 
places of exceptional natural beauty. That is admirable work, whether done by local 
authorities, private owners, or by the National Trust, to all of whom we owe a good 
deal of it. But it is not enough. It does not cover more than a fraction of the ground.30   
 
The formation of CPRE was ranked as one of the top ten news stories of the year by the 
Manchester Guardian’s “Century” archive project, in a year that included the General Strike, 
the first transatlantic phone conversation, and the first demonstration of television by John 
Logie Baird.31 
 
It is important to note that the word “preservation” in CPRE’s name (changed later in the 
Twentieth Century to “protection”) was not to be taken too literally; its 1927 Aims and 
Objectives clearly stated that ‘it is not intended to object to the reasonable use and 
development of rural areas: it is the abuse and bad development of such areas that require 
restrictions.’32  Professor Patrick Abercrombie, founding member and one of the key 
influences behind CPRE’s policy development over the following twenty years, was more 
forthcoming in the book he had published shortly before CPRE’s formal foundation in 1926.  
As noted in Chapter One (p.26), in it he stated quite bluntly that ‘it may become more 
                                                 
30 The Times, ‘The Saving of Rural England’ 24/11/1926, p. 15 
31 Waine, 22 Ideas, p.48 
32 CPRE Aims and Objectives 1927, (CPRE HQ Archive), p.1 
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economical to work fields in larger units, entailing the removal of hedges and trees.’33  By 
1934 Abercrombie had added an aesthetic justification to his previous economical one:  
 
there are certainly parts of England whose landscape will be improved by a greater 
display of sweeps of open, highly cropped fields: a new scale may be added to what in 
some places is a monotonous iteration of hedge and hedgerow tree. Everywhere, 
where this agricultural change occurs, the quality of landscape fitness and beauty is to 
be super-added.34 
 
These positions would be hugely significant in determining CPRE’s position during the long 
Second World War, and shows that at this time the organisation’s focus was very much on 
creating a rural identity through what it judged to be appropriate rural development.  An 
appreciation of the impact of agricultural change on flora and fauna would only come later in 
the Twentieth Century, otherwise CPRE may have appreciated that the low commercial value 
attached to agriculture and forestry in the inter-war period meant that many important sites 
for wildlife survived free from human intervention.35 
 
The National Trust, or to give it its full name, the National Trust for Places of Historic 
Interest or Natural Beauty,36 was originally incorporated as a charitable body in 1895.  It was 
subsequently dissolved and reconstituted as a statutory body by the National Trust Act of 
1907, a measure designed to empower the Trust through enabling it to own land and property 
inalienably, making it a ‘quasi-public body independent of direct State control’ in the words 
                                                 
33 Abercrombie, Preservation, p.7 
34 Matless,  Landscape, (Abercrombie, Country Planning and Landscape Design,( University Press of Liverpool 
/ Hodder & Stoughton, 1934, p.12), p.72  
35 Sheail, Nature in Trust, p.56 
36  National Trust Act 1907 (National Trust website) 
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of its Governing Council;37 furthermore, the Act protected Trust property from compulsory 
acquisition except by a subsequent Act of Parliament.38  The Trust’s 1938/39 Annual Report 
stated: ‘it is the primary duty of the Trust to promote the natural beauty of its properties,’39 
although in 1937 the Trust only owned approximately 60,000 acres of land,40 a relatively 
modest accumulation of property given it had at that time been in existence forty years.  
 
This primary duty had the effect on the one hand of limiting what the Trust could and would 
do to defend and protect the interests of land and property that it did not own, whilst resisting 
as effectively as it could threats to that which it did.  In response to a request from the Trust 
Secretary to his Finance Committee as to the guidance he should give to Trust officials asked 
to give support to other amenity bodies, the response was ‘where NT’s property rights were 
in danger it should offer stout-hearted opposition.  Where this was not the case there could be 
no clear cut policy which would meet every case.’41  Although this guidance was given in 
1946, the Trust’s previous behaviour reflected this position; this would be an important factor 
in its approach towards the threats to the landscape and environment posed by the long 
Second World War, and help to define its relationship with CPRE. 
 
As an organisation with constituent members CPRE was at the point at which the four 
organisations met and overlapped.  NT was a founding affiliate member of the CPRE and 
PRS joined in June 1927.42  By 1944 CPRE and NSAS would have two honorary officers in 
common, most notably Sir Lawrence Chubb, one of the founders of CPRE.  Similarly, 
Abercrombie, a key member of CPRE’s EC and to be Chairman from mid-1938, was on the 
                                                 
37 NT Annual Report, 1941-42, (NT HQ archive), p.7 
38 Waterson, The National Trust, pp.52-4 
39NTAnnual Report, 1938-39, (NT HQ archive), p.5 
40  E M Forster, Havoc, pp.44-47, in C. Williams-Ellis, Britain and the Beast (ed.), ( J.M. Dent and Sons 1937), 
p.46 
41 NT Finance Committee Minutes 15/3/1946, (NT HQ archive), p..2185 
42  letter from PRS to CPRE, 17/6/1927, (MERL SR CPRE C /1/54/23) 
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Trust’s EC from at least 1936, and on its Council from 1938.  These two organisations had 
the potential to take on certain defined roles in order to achieve shared goals.  For example, 
CPRE EC minutes of 11th January 1938 report that the Trust had approached the War Office 
regarding the latter’s desire to acquire a Trust site near Blakeney Point in Norfolk but that it: 
‘had received no satisfaction and had therefore asked the CPRE to arrange for publicity,’43 a 
role that the Trust assigned to CPRE as it regarded them as ‘protagonists in propaganda.’44  
This reflected the Trust’s more conservative and private approach to representing its interests, 
and CPRE’s more direct, public one.  There was also however warmth and cooperation at an 
individual level, as illustrated by a note from the NT Secretary to his CPRE counterpart: 
‘Dear Griffin, have you as yet any idea when and where your 1940 conference will be? We 
are planning one at Bath for May or thereabouts and don’t want to clash with you.’45 
 
C. Bailey characterises the individuals who populated these emerging organisations as part of 
a “new professionalism,”46 replacing the “noblesse oblige”47 pushed into decline by the First 
World War and the inter-war economic depression.  I would argue that the foundation of the 
CPRE, NSAS and PRS in the second half of 1920s was not a coincidence, and represented a 
desire by these “new professionals” to create more focused and effective methods of working 
to protect the environment and rural landscape, given what they perceived to be worsening air 
and water pollution and change to the rural landscape as a result of the factors discussed 
above.  PRS brought a technical approach to the issue of water pollution, which previously 
had been dominated by the amenity-focused angling and fisheries constituency; CPRE 
represented a coordinated method of working through the formation of a broad rural-interest 
coalition, and NSAS, in amalgamating two existing and overlapping smoke abatement 
                                                 
43 CPRE EC Minutes 11/1/1938, (MERL SR CPRE A/3), ‘Defence departments and acquisition of land’ 
44 NT Finance Committee Minutes  15/3/46, p.2185 
45 Letter from NT Secretary to CPRE counterpart, 4/7/1939, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/49/107) 
46 Bailey, Progress, p.35 
47 Ibid. 
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organisations, sought to harness the assets of both and achieve greater effectiveness through 
creating a single unitary entity.  
 
The lack of adequate intervention by the State across the inter-war period both contributed to 
the perceived need for these organisations and subsequently vindicated their existence.  Inter-
war British politics was dominated by the inter-war economic depression and the 
predominance of a laissez-faire economic policy by successive governments.48  Whilst 
Ramsey Macdonald and Neville Chamberlain, as leaders of their Labour and Conservative 
parties respectively, gave personal support to organisations concerned with rural preservation 
and amenities, this did not translate into government funds for conservation,49 as 
‘bureaucratic opinion...[was]…determinedly hostile to the expenditure of public monies on 
anything…[as]…aesthetic as environmental protection.’50 51  Similarly, the other major inter-
war political figure and Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, eulogised about rural landscapes 
and its habitats, but as Mandler observes pithily: ‘one speech by Stanley Baldwin evoking the 
sounds of scythes and corncrakes – more often quoted in the 1980s than in the 1920s – does 
not signify a policy.’52  As a consequence, a modest stream of underpowered, compromised 
legislation purporting to address concerns over air and water pollution and threats to rural 
landscapes resulted during the inter-war period.  Commenting in 1930, PRS would view the 
Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act of 1923 as having: ‘inadequate pollution clauses which 
could too easily be circumvented by polluters;’53 NSAS would charitably view the Public 
Health (Smoke Abatement) Act of 1926 as representing the best efforts of its predecessor 
                                                 
48 Mandler, Fall, p.238 
49 Sheail, Nature Conservation, p.7 
50 P. Mandler, ‘Politics and the English Landscape Since the First World War,’ Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 
(Vol. 55, (1992) , pp. 459-76), (J. Minihan, The Nationalisation of Culture (London 1977) pp.138-41 and 
pp.161-67) , p.463 
51 Mandler, Against, p.173 
52 Ibid. 
53 First Annual, PRS, 1930, p.2 
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bodies, but that ultimately its effectiveness was frustrated by industry and government,54 and 
therefore only offered ‘fragmentary provisions.’55  The Town and Country Planning Act, 
1932, did give local authorities the power to take measures for the preservation of scenic 
amenity,56 such as in Section 34, where planning authorities could make agreements with 
landowners to restrict development of land,57 but as J. Loweson observes, both the 1932 Act 
and the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act of 1935 were generally toothless gestures 
towards conservation and preservation, ‘more expressive of a Victorian conception of 
permissive restriction than of the emergent doctrine of progressive control.’58 
 
Even the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, R.S Hudson, speaking to CPRE’s 
Annual General Meeting in December 1944, conceded that agriculture had only been 
mentioned in the 1932 Planning Act: ‘for the purpose of excluding it as a factor which should 
count in planning.’59  In a similar obfuscatory vein, the Public Health Act of 1936 seemed to 
offer an effective remedy to polluted rivers, but any hope raised was short lived as the Act 
was modified by the Public Health (Drainage of Trade Premises) Act (1937),60 which made 
the provisions “arguably both inflexible and complex.”61   
 
2.5  Protecting the Rural Idyll As Patriotic Duty 
In conclusion, I will explore the use and generation of patriotic sentiment by CPRE as a 
campaigning device in support of the defence of environment and landscape in the inter-war 
                                                 
54 NSAS Comes of Age,  p.2 
55 J.B. Sanderson, ‘The National Smoke Abatement Society and the Clean Air Act (1956),’ Political Studies, 
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p.236 
56 V. Cornish, The Preservation of Our Scenery: essays and addresses,  (Cambridge University Press  1937), 
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57 Sheail, Nature in Trust, p.88 
58 Loweson, Battles, p.266 
59 CPRE Report, March 1945, p.11 
60 R. Bate, Saving Our Streams: the role of the Anglers’ Conservation Association in protecting English and 
Welsh rivers, (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2001), p.35 
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50 
 
period.  This patriotic identification with the countryside, I argue, explains the organisation’s 
subsequent unequivocal support for Britain’s war effort and therefore its preparedness to 
countenance significant degrees of environmental damage and change to the rural landscape 
as part of that effort, whilst nevertheless, also as a patriotic duty, preserving and restoring that 
same landscape where and whenever possible. 
 
The notion of the rural idyll was not an inter-war phenomenon, although the spike in its 
popularity during this time may have made it appear so.  It could be dated back to Theocritus, 
Ancient Greek creator of pastoral, or at least to the eighteenth century and William Gilpin’s 
“picturesque” concept which popularised the appreciation of the British landscape according 
to the aesthetics of painting,62 and James Thomson’s fusion of landscape and national identity 
in his poem ‘The Seasons.’63  Mandler makes a case for the “new professional” organisations 
representing a break from the past, and the desire to create, for example in CPRE’s 
embracing of agricultural development: ‘broad acres of well-cultivated and well-tended 
countryside presented a refreshingly modern, efficient and ordered contrast to the backward 
muddle that was “Old England”,’64 and in so doing this might represent ‘a new idea of 
heritage’65  However, CPRE in particular chose to communicate its principles through 
“cultural representations of the countryside”66 that continued to tap into these long-standing 
tropes of the rural idyll.  In only its second full year of operation, 1928, CPRE produced the 
“Saint George for Rural England” postcard (see following page): 
 
 
                                                 
62 V. Elson, Creating, p.13 
63 Groom, N. ‘Let’s Discuss Over Country Supper Soon: rural realities and rustic representations,’ pp.48-60, in 
V.Elson, Creating, p.53 
64 Mandler, Fall, p.267 
65 Ibid. 
66 J. Burchardt, ‘The Rural Idyll: A Critique,’ pp. 64-73, in V.Elson, Creating, p.70 
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[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
Fig. 4 67 
In D. Matless’ view, this image linked the ‘fundamental patriotic authority’ of the saint 
against ‘a dragon of laissez-faire commercial culture’68 such as industry and its pollution, 
petrol stations, road-side advertising and litter.  Ten years later, in 1938, when needing to 
“instil national pride”69 in the countryside and thereby maintain its campaigning pressure on 
the creation of national parks, CPRE produced the film Rural England: the case for the 
defence. The opening frame (see page below) brought a return to the 1928 postcard 
typography, as can be seen in Fig. 4 below: the letters ‘C’ ‘P’ ‘R’ ‘E’ positioned clockwise 
around a Saint George cross, framed by dislocated phrases from Act Two, Scene One of 
Shakespeare’s Richard II,70 in faux Anglo-Saxon lettering.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Matless, Landscape, p.47 
68 Ibid. 
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70 2.i.50,43 
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Fig 571  
 
The film goes on to ask cinema-goers:  
 
are you going to allow such scenic loveliness to be despoiled because you won’t fight 
to preserve it?...the road to freedom; freedom of England’s country. That is the case 
for the defence of our right to the beauty of our land72 
 
In addition to being shown in nearly a thousand cinemas in Britain in 1939, the British 
Council chose it to represent ‘the best of England’ in the New York World Fair of 1939.73 
The quoting of these particular words of Shakespeare’s, when it was recognised in 1938-39 
that the nation was again on the eve of war, cannot, I argue, have been coincidental; 
Shakespeare’s creation of John of Gaunt’s dying lament in 1595’s Richard II had dutifully 
been helping to promote the Elizabethan agenda of national unification with the country’s 
topography in a supporting role.  As R. Williams ruefully observes: ‘a landscape is never so 
                                                 
71 CPRE; ‘Rural England: The Case for the Defence,’ 1939 
72 Ibid. 
73 Waine, 22 Ideas, p.104 
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valuable as when it is under threat, and the English rural countryside has been the subject of 
alarm for centuries,’74  
 
CPRE also used literature to communicate its propaganda messages, most notably The 
Scenery of England, published by CPRE in 193275 and the previously cited Britain and the 
Beast (p.48 above) in 1937; the latter was edited by Clough Williams Ellis, the CPRE Wales 
representative on CPRE’s EC, and was subsequently endorsed by both CPRE and NT, 
featuring short advertorial chapters on each.  In such cases rhetorical flourishes championing 
a rural idyll contrasted with this new professionalism, such as E.M. Forster’s contribution to 
Britain and the Beast referring to ‘the England which we love and are losing’76 and 
prophesying that the Defence Departments requisitioning of land would make them become 
‘serious enemies of what is left of England;’77 what Matless describes as ‘preservationist 
angry writing,’78  As this dissertation will show in the next chapter, this campaigning 
literature was not representative of the emerging CPRE policy regarding Defence Department 
land requisitioning in the long Second World War; of this period CPRE now says 
unapologetically and without a hint of false modesty:  
 
nowadays we take it for granted that we’re stewards of the English countryside and 
have a moral duty to protect it, but that perception didn’t appear by magic – it was 
nurtured over two World Wars by our artists and film makers, Government 
propaganda, and in no small part by the CPRE 79 
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This chapter has outlined a number of practical motivations for the founding of the 
organisations under consideration. The notion of protecting the countryside as a patriotic duty 
was an important rhetorical tool for the government during the First World War, yet as we 
have seen, much of the legislation passed during the inter-war period that purported to protect 
it was weak and compromised, and together with the scale of the problems facing the 
environment and rural landscape, led to the foundation of three of the four organisations 
considered in this dissertation.  In the case of CPRE, despite the professional background of 
many of its key individuals, it could engage in similar patriotic rhetoric in order to generate 
public support for its campaign aims and objectives. 
 
The next chapter will explore the initial years of the long Second World War, during which 
initial war preparations began to take their toll of the environment and landscape, and 
challenged CPRE and the National Trust to develop effective and appropriate responses to 
direct challenges to their aims and objectives.   
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‘members of the executive, local branches and fiery individual enthusiasts make this Rural 
movement…an arena of glorious work’1 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Long Second World War, 1936 to 1939 
 
The British Government’s Defence Departments began their preparations for war between 
1936 and 1939. The environmental impact of these preparations was primarily on land and 
landscape and this chapter on the early years of the Long Second World War will therefore 
focus on CPRE and NT. As we will see, for all four organisations, support for the war effort 
was a given, and for CPRE and NT their positions on how to respond to the impact on the 
rural environment and landscape of the war effort were to a large extent determined before 
the outbreak of war; they reached these positions with little apparent significant internal 
discussion, and prior to issuing public statements on the subject. The beginning (and indeed 
the end) of the war passed almost unobserved in the minutes of the four organisations, yet 
particularly in the case of CPRE and the Trust, preparation for war propelled them to engage 
at a heightened level with the State apparatus several years before war was declared. What 
follows in this chapter is an analysis of how the organisations responded to the challenges to 
their interests posed by State preparation for war: its requisition of land and the consequent 
loss of rural landscape.  During this period the organisations needed to develop 
communication channels through which their interests could be successfully represented to a 
range of government departments concerned with the war effort (particularly the Air 
Ministry), in a collaborative and relatively non-adversarial manner. Although general 
                                                 
1 P. Abercrombie, Unpublished account, No. 20, Part VI 18 Months of Activities 1938 to August 1939;  II: 
“Voluntary work” (i) re CPRE, (SCA D439/11/4/8 /19-22) , pp.3-4 
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knowledge of these channels was in the public domain at the time, the details remained 
largely private and unrecorded for reasons of national security.  Their existence is significant 
for two reasons: firstly, it provided them with a level of influence over the implementation of 
policies related to the war effort (although not the development of policy) out of all 
proportion to their relatively small size (p.28 above).  Secondly, these were “establishment” 
voluntary organisations (above, pages 26 and 29 manned (and I use the word advisedly) by 
relatively conventional members of the upper and middle classes, who were squarely behind 
the war effort when war was declared.  This contrasted with the more esoteric and 
individualistic free-thinkers of the loosely formed organic movement, who were singularly 
unsuccessful in securing influence during the war because relatively few of them were 
supportive of the war effort; as Philip Cornford writes, ‘organicism’ was entangled with a 
range of  ‘eccentric and unstable, disreputable and hated ideas.’2  Although there is no 
evidence that support for the war effort amongst CPRE, NT, NSAS and PRS was in any sense 
less than sincere, clearly this loyalty would prove tactically beneficial in any engagement 
with the State.  
 
3.1  Response to the Initial Impact of War Preparations on the Rural Landscape  
In 1934/35 the loss of agricultural land in England and Wales to the Air Ministry was 3,000 
acres, and by 1938/1939 had risen to 24,500 acres.3  How the CPRE and NT dealt with initial 
land requisitioning proposals established some key operating principles for subsequent years.  
What appears to be CPRE’s first engagement in the issue is to be found in its EC Minutes of 
29th October 19354 regarding an Air Ministry proposal to establish an aerodrome near the 
Dorset village of Woodsford:   
 
                                                 
2 Cornford, Origins, p.12 
3 Stamp, Land, p.432 
4 CPRE EC Minutes, 29/10/1935, (MERL SR CPRE A/3), ‘Woodsford Aerodrome’ 
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the CPRE objection might be on the grounds that the proposed site was in the middle 
of what was known as the “Hardy Country” and this was the only ground upon which 
objection could be taken from the public standpoint…it was decided that the CPRE 
could take no action on the matter 5  
 
A month later the item was again on the agenda and CPRE agreed to associate itself with the 
local County Council’s opposition to it,6 but by January 1936 the Air Ministry had turned 
down an alternative site proposal, and said that if necessary, it would take steps to acquire the 
site compulsorily;7 CPRE withdrew its objection.  A few months later, faced with an outbreak 
of Air Ministry demands for aerodromes in Gloucestershire, CPRE identified the wider issue 
of plans being initiated without prior consultation with County Council or Planning 
Authorities, and wrote to the Air Ministry.8  By October it was faced with further instances in 
Lancashire, Wiltshire and Wales; the issue of Defence Department land acquisitions would 
now be a virtually ever-present agenda item at the CPRE’s monthly EC meetings in this long 
war.  That month CPRE’s Secretary, H.G. Griffin wrote to W.F. Ascroft of CPRE’s 
Lancashire Branch that opposition without the suggestion of viable alternatives was unlikely 
to succeed, and that ‘Defence Departments would be much more vulnerable…from the point 
of view of the uses to which land acquired by them was put after they had finished with it,’9 
because currently there were insufficient safeguards on to what use the land could be put 
once the Defence Departments no longer needed the site.10  CPRE’s hope was that Defence 
Departments would consult with local councils and planning authorities prior to purchase, or 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 CPRE EC Minutes 26/11/1935, (MERL SR CPRE A/3) 
7 CPRE EC Minutes 29/1/1936, (MERL SR CPRE A/3) 
8 CPRE EC Minutes 28/4/1936, (MERL SR CPRE A/3 
9 H.G. Griffin letter to W.F. Ascroft,  28/10/1936, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1) 
10 Ibid. 
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if this was too much to ask given the ‘present state of national urgency and emergency,’11 
then the matter should be the subject of inter-departmental consultation, particularly with the 
Ministry of Health given its brief (p.42 above).  In the same year (1936), NT’s EC decided to 
resist the Air Ministry’s plans to establish bombing and machine gun practice areas near 
Farne Islands, on the grounds that they were being ‘detrimental to the purposes for which 
these islands had been acquired by the Trust.12 
 
The examples above illustrate a number of important points regarding the development of 
CPRE’s decision making criteria for dealing with land requisition issues.  Firstly, that CPRE 
was not confident defending a proposed site against requisition purely on the basis of its 
amenity or cultural value in a rural area of no particular special significance; secondly, it was 
wary of being the sole body in opposition against government; thirdly, that a viable 
alternative site was essential if a position of opposition was chosen; fourthly, that it was 
aiming to establish some form of mechanism through which elements of the State concerned 
with planning and the environment could have influence over the requisitioning process, and 
lastly, that even three-to-four years before the Second World War would begin, CPRE was 
already taking into account the post-war period when determining what their policy should 
be.  In the case of NT, the key point to observe is the phrase ‘acquired by the Trust’ a few 
lines above, as it illustrates that a significant determining factor in the Trust’s actions was 
whether it owned land or property which was affected by Defence Department intentions; this 
is directly associated with the way the Trust was established, as we have seen (p.47 above). 
 
Throughout 1936 to 1937 there were instances of intransigence, subterfuge, veiled threats of 
troublesome political lobbying, and the attempts of press and literature to fan flames of 
                                                 
11 CPRE Monthly Report December 1936,(Vol. VIII, No.2), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/8), p.21 
12 NT EC Minutes 13/1/1936, (NT HQ Archive), ‘Reports of Sub-Committees’ 
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righteous indignation over the land requisition issue.  The Times reported in December 1936 
that the Secretary of State for War had refused to enter into an agreement with the 
Gloucestershire local authorities to the effect that when the War Department had finished 
with the land it was requisitioning, it would be subject to planning regulations.13  In May the 
Manchester Guardian editorialised, in a manner that bore an uncanny resemblance to J.B. 
Priestley’s polemics (pages 13 and 15 above):  
 
what is the fatal fascination which draws our Defence Departments, when they are in 
search of sites for new depots, nearly always to scenes of great beauty or historic 
interest…[several instances are then cited]…but what is the policy which directs so 
many similar descents on quiet centres of interest and beauty, and why has it to be 
fought again and again?14  
 
In a letter of May 1937 from Griffin at CPRE to a J.C.Wrigley at the Ministry of Health 
Griffin notes a further four instances of Defence Departments seeking to acquire sites with: 
 
the apparent reluctance of the Defence Departments to consider any interests other 
than their own…we cannot ascertain that there has been any consultation between 
your Department and the War Office or the Air Ministry about what is taking place 
there…[followed the political threat]…I believe that it will be in the interests of 
[your] Department…to try and meet this criticism, which to our certain knowledge is 
increasing rapidly all over the country and will undoubtedly give rise to innumerable 
questions in the House and Parliamentary action once more, if something is not done15 
 
                                                 
13 The Times, ‘Land for Defence Factories: Selection of Rural Sites,’ 17/12/1936, p.11 
14 Manchester Guardian, ‘Beauty and the Beast,’ 6/5/1937, p.10 
15 Griffin letter to J. C. Wrigley at Ministry of Health 7/5/1937, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1)  
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The National Trust also weighed in with calls for consultation; in a letter from Griffin’s 
Secretary counterpart at NT, D.M. Matheson, to the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir 
Thomas Inskip, in May 1937, he offered helpfully that: 
 
however anxious those responsible may be to avoid places of especial historic or 
scientific interest or national beauty, there is in many areas no easily available record 
to guide them…[but help was at hand, albeit one carrying a stick]…the National Trust 
therefore strongly urge that, before such schemes are put into operation, there should 
be private and preliminary consultation with some persons or body with special 
knowledge of areas the selection of which would be likely to arouse strong public 
protest because of their outstanding interest.16 
 
This was the kind of work NT concentrated on: private, political diplomacy; a CPRE EC note 
from January 1938 illuminates the division of responsibilities that the two organisations had 
developed, as noted above [page reference].  Regarding Defence Departments’ intentions for 
NT’s Blakeney Point, in Norfolk, the minutes record that: ‘the National Trust had approached 
the War Office privately and had received no satisfaction and had therefore asked the CPRE 
to arrange for publicity.’17  
 
There was a new dimension to CPRE’s argument by July 1937, invoking the importance of 
agriculture in the requisition equation; whilst CPRE had since its inception been a strong 
advocate for agricultural development, this was the first time, as far as their archives show, 
that it was linked with their attempt to influence initial Defence Department preferences for 
sites.  That month Griffin wrote to the Air Ministry Secretary in aid of a site for a depot at 
                                                 
16 Matheson letter to Inskip, 13/5/1937, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1)  
17 NT EC Minutes, 11/1/1938, (MERL SR CPRE A/3), ‘Defence Departments and Acquisition of  Land’  
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Bishops Cleeve in Gloucestershire, asking if was possible to acquire a site less valued for its 
aesthetic and agricultural value.  Griffin sought to placate the Air Ministry Secretary by 
accepting that CPRE was of course not trying to question the military advantages of the 
proposed site, and then did just that, by adding that ‘doubtless the authorities have noted that 
it is very well marked by the race course in close proximity,’18 thereby intimating that if plans 
went ahead then in due course the Luftwaffe would be able to get their bearings easily 
enough for a bombing run on the depot.  By the end of 1937 the documents considered above 
suggest that CPRE had a working, if not formally agreed, policy stance consisting of four 
main tenets: that in the final resort national defence must take precedence, but that other 
national interests, especially those of agriculture, should receive due consideration before 
final decisions were made about sites were finally selected; and thirdly and fourthly, that 
there should be Defence Department consultation with local authorities under Section 33 of 
the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932, and also inter-departmental consultation 
between the Defence Departments and those ministries concerned with agriculture and the 
environment.19 
 
By the time of its 1938 Annual Report CPRE’s policy stance was more formalised.  One of 
its principal objectives was now ‘the establishment of inter-consultative machinery between 
the Defence Departments and other Departments of State representing other national interests 
e.g. health, agriculture (etc.).’20  The organisation had already written to the Ministry of 
Health in February 1937 on this subject, and was awaiting a detailed response, but during the 
second half of 1937 Griffin worked with the Wiltshire CPRE branch, which was particularly 
severely hit by Defence Department requisition orders,21 on a draft letter to Neville 
                                                 
18 Griffin to The Secretary, Air Ministry 5/7/37, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1) 
19 CPRE Eleventh Annual Report 1937, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/11), p.7  
20 CPRE Twelfth Annual Report 1938, p.3  
21 CPRE Annual General Meeting, 2/5/39, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/12), p.32  
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Chamberlain, Prime Minister since May 1937.  The letter and memorandum, ostensibly from 
Lord Herbert, the Chair of Wiltshire CPRE, included the Lord Lieutenant of the county and a 
number of other signatories from Wiltshire’s landed community, and covered the main tenets 
of CPRE’s argument.  It asked for the Prime Minister’s interjection in the issue; CPRE 
awaited a response for several months.  It had been a demanding year: CPRE had been 
involved in a total of 20 major cases during the previous twelve months, of which three, 
according to CPRE, were dropped due to ‘parliamentary criticism’ and some others did not 
go ahead for other reasons or in amended form as a result of CPRE and NT intervention.22 
 
CPRE were aided and abetted in the development of their methodology and tactics by 
invaluable informal and sometimes private and confidential communications from civil 
servants, referring to each other on first name (or rather last name) terms illustrating a 
familiarity as a result of inhabiting the same social, cultural and educational milieu.  For 
example, there are several pieces of “Dear Griffin” / “Dear Sheepshanks” correspondence 
between H.G. Griffin and T.H. Sheepshanks in the 1937 to 1938 period, such as the letter 
from Griffin to Sheepshanks of 2/2/1937.23  Sheepshanks was at this time Assistant Secretary 
in the Town and Country Planning Division of the Ministry of Health, so a key contact.  An 
EC minute of that month records that CPRE and others met with Sheepshanks and another 
civil servant who provided valuable intelligence as to how government departments should be 
lobbied:  
 
in connection with factory sites they were consulted through the Ministry of Labour, 
but that in connection with operational stations like Munition Dumps, Aerodromes, 
the Defence Departments were paramount…the Ministry of Health think the CPRE 
                                                 
22 CPRE Eleventh Annual Report 1937, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/11), p.7 
23 Griffin letter to Sheepshanks 2/2/37, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1) 
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should continue their practice of making representations direct and informing the 
Ministry accordingly.24 
 
Further, it was to be Sheepshanks that same month who rang Griffin in the strictest 
confidence to advise CPRE that it would be in its and the National Trust’s interests to work in 
close cooperation vis-à-vis the Defence Departments and their land acquisition proposals, as 
he had become aware that the Trust was in bilateral discussions with these departments, and 
there was the potential for the existing discussions not just to be limited to NT properties, 
therefore possibly prejudicing CPRE interests.  Griffin promptly informed Abercrombie, who 
was on the EC of both organisations, asking him to entreaty the Trust Secretary Matheson to 
be clear in the Trust’s dealings with the Defence Departments that it was confining its views 
to their own property interests and if they did act independently, to make it quite clear that 
they did so without prejudice to any CPRE representations.25   
 
Thus in this period CPRE had established: its key priorities for engaging with the 
Government on the issue of land requisitions, vital back-channels with influential civil 
servants, a working co-operative relationship with its main ally in land requisition isssues, the 
National Trust, with regard to challenging land requisitions, and a track record in successfully 
influencing the outcome of Defence Department requisition proposals.  It had not yet, 
however, secured the inter-departmental consultative process that it sought to have installed, 
whereby Defence Departments would have to engage with the Town and Country Planning 
Division within the Ministry of Health and relevant local authorities.  The next section of this 
chapter will explore to what extent it achieved this, as the settlement reached provided CPRE 
                                                 
24 CPRE EC Minutes 13/7/1937, (MERL SR CPRE A/3) 
25 “private and confidential” letter, Griffin to Abercrombie 15/7/1937, (MERL SR CPRE C/1/137/1) 
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and NT with their operating framework for addressing requisitioning grievances during the 
Second World War. 
 
3.2  The Achievement of Influence and Its Consequences: 1938 to 1939 
When the Prime Minister’s response to Lord Herbert and Wiltshire CPRE’s letter was 
received in January 1938 it fundamentally transformed the nature of the relationship between 
CPRE, NT, the Defence Departments and other government departments that had a stake in 
the rural environment and landscape.  Now they would be acknowledged stakeholders, on the 
inside of a communications loop, albeit certainly not equal partners.  Chamberlain responded 
clearly and directly to what he termed ‘non-defence interests when sites are being selected for 
Government establishments;’26 whilst he made it clear that the needs of the Defence 
Departments were bound ultimately to receive priority, that it was not possible to avoid all of 
the issues which concerned CPRE and that in the interests of national defence he was against 
an ‘over-elaboration of consultative machinery,’ he had nevertheless instructed the Defence 
and other departments concerned to consider the contents of CPRE’s letter, and required each 
Defence Department to establish a procedure: 
 
which will ensure that other interests of national importance shall receive adequate 
consideration when the selection and development of sites are being carried out and 
that that consideration shall take place in time to enable due weight to be given to the 
results by the Departments concerned, before decisions as to acquisition are taken.27 
 
                                                 
26 CPRE Monthly Report February 1938, (Vol. X, No.4), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/10), pp.12-13 
27 Ibid. 
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The Minister for the Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, in a written statement to 
Parliament, said the actual consultative procedure which each Department would take would 
probably differ according to the particular requirements of the Department concerned.28   
Chamberlain’s concession to organisations concerned with the environment represents a quite 
exceptional demonstration of support by a Prime Minister who, whilst investing considerably 
more hope in efforts for peace (ultimately to his detriment) than some of his fellow 
politicians, was nevertheless at the time presiding over a government that was slowly and 
steadily preparing for war.  It was not however totally surprising, as Chamberlain was a long-
standing appreciator of nature and supporter of civil society efforts to protect Britain’s 
landscape.  Just a month before the letter from Herbert was sent to him, he had attended the 
Tenth National Conference For The Preservation Of The Countryside, and commented of 
CPRE that ‘for many years I have been a supporter of the Council and have watched their 
work with keen interest.’29 He also allowed 10 Downing Street to be used to host CPRE’s 
fundraising ‘England Ball Committee,’30 and as Minister of Health in December 1926 he had 
attended CPRE’s inaugural meeting, at which he declared that he was ‘most heartily to give 
my support and approval to the objects of this new Council…[and was]…deeply concerned at 
the persistent and rapid defacement of the countryside.’31   
 
The Air Ministry’s approach to Chamberlain’s requirement was almost immediate; on 1st 
March 1938 its Secretary of State announced the appointment of Abercrombie as a consultant 
to the acquisition of sites demanded by the expansion of the RAF.32  CPRE regarded it as “the 
first fruits of the announcement made on behalf of the Prime Minister and embodied in his 
                                                 
28 The Times, ‘Defence Sites,’ 2/2/1938, p. 12 
29 CPRE Monthly Report November 1937, (Vol. X, No.2), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/10), p.4 
30 The Times, ‘Preserving Rural England.’ 2/5/1939, p. 11 
31 Record of Inaugural meeting of CPRE, 7/12/26,(CPRE HQ Archive), p.9 
32 CPRE EC Minutes, 8/3/1938, (MERL CPRE SR A/3), ‘Defence Departments’ 
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letter to Lord Herbert.”33  At CPRE’s EC meeting on 8th March Abercrombie stated that 
‘members might rest assured that as far as he possibly could, their interests would receive 
every possible consideration.’34 
 
These mechanisms and understandings were put in place during the course of 1938 and gave 
CPRE and NT a degree of consultation and influence unparalleled in their albeit relatively 
brief histories. For Abercrombie, who was at the apex of the consultation process, working 
for the Air Ministry and on the Executive Committees of both CPRE and NT, it was ‘the best 
of a job that would satisfy no one,’35 as he recalls CPRE’s President, Lord Crawford, saying 
of his new appointment; Abercrombie himself found the work both ‘troublesome and 
upsetting:’36  
 
The attempt, in a report, to decide what weight to attach to objections by Local 
Authorities, the local branch of the CPRE, the Farmers’ Union, the landowner or 
villagers affected: on the other hand to consider whether the Ministry were justified, 
whether speed…must prevail or whether a rash and unconsidered choice should be 
abandoned – these attempts were no light tasks…I don’t think I have once been 
thanked for saving a man from having an aerodrome on the other side of his garden 
fence37 
 
In its Monthly Report of April/May 1939 CPRE reflected on the previous year: 
 
                                                 
33 CPRE Monthly Report December 1936, pp.16-17 
34 CPRE EC Minutes 8/3/1938, (MERL SR CPRE A/3) 
35 P. Abercrombie, Unpublished account, No.20; “Part VI, 18 Months of Activities 1938 to August 1939, III 
Professional, (SCA D439/11/4/8 /19-22), p.16   
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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The CPRE had hoped that, with the appointment of Professor Abercrombie as adviser 
on sites to the Air Ministry…and the arrangements made by the other Departments… 
the acquisition of land for defence and kindred objects would proceed with less 
friction than in the past.  With one or two noted exceptions this has on the whole been 
the case38 
 
This chapter has focused on the initial scale and impact of war preparations on the rural 
landscape, and the organisational response of CPRE in particular; CPRE developed working 
criteria for balancing the achievement of its aims and objectives with the demands of war 
preparations.  It has shown that, following an initial period of poor communications and 
frustration, CPRE and NT were able to develop channels of communications with 
government in order to further their aims and objectives during the initial phase of the long 
Second World War.  It has also drawn attention to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s role 
in the development of these channels, and concluded that CPRE and the National Trust were 
strengthened at a time when their interests might have seemed most seriously challenged. 
Although Chamberlain’s response had not given CPRE the formal inter-departmental 
consultative machinery it had wanted, it gave it, and NT, a mechanism through which they 
could expect to be consulted before decisions relating to land requisition were taken. 
 
The next chapter examines the war-time activities of the four organisations, looking at the 
decision making processes that determined their priorities during this period, and through 
interrogating a range of war-effort related issues that impacted on the environment and 
landscape, assesses to what extent they were able to balance their key aims and objectives 
with their support for the war effort. 
                                                 
38 CPRE Monthly Report, April/May 1939, (Vol. XII, No.4), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/12), p.25 
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‘war shook up the geography of England, unsettling people and their objects, transforming 
landscapes, moving things to where they weren’t before’1 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Long Second World War: the Outbreak of War, Its Impact and the Response of CPRE, 
National Trust, NSAS and PRS, 1939 to 1946 
 
This chapter will focus on the decisions and activities of the above four organisations with 
regard to how they responded to the impact of the war-time war effort on the issues that they 
were established to address.  It will look at the decision making processes that the respective 
organisations undertook regarding continuing their work during war-time, and what their 
priorities were, and were not.  All of the organisations were clear and unequivocal in their 
support for the war-effort, but careful not to give the State a blank cheque to do what it 
wanted in the name of protecting Britain against Nazi Germany.  I will analyse the balance 
these organisations performed with regard to impacts that they acquiesced to, those that they 
were active in opposing, and identify instances where there was a convergence of interests 
between the State and the organisations. 
 
4.1  CPRE, the National Trust, NSAS and PRS: War-time Policies and Priorities 
As noted above (p.11), when war was declared on 3rd September 1939, CPRE, NT, NSAS 
and PRS could have no idea what was ahead of them; one gets a sense from the archives of 
all four organisations that whilst they pledged to continue their work, they really had no idea 
how this might be possible.  Across all four organisations normal committee structures were 
                                                 
1 Matless, Landscape, p.239 
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abandoned and streamlined because of the difficulty of getting to meetings, and the loss of 
some staff and honorary officers to war-related duties; some sub-committees would not meet 
at all during the war, and some internal and external communications were reduced to save 
paper.  Headquarters were moved out to the Home Counties as London was not deemed safe, 
then moved back when it was deemed safer; this was a realistic concern, as during the course 
of the war the London headquarters of two of the organisations would be damaged by 
Luftwaffe bombing raids. 
 
Further, the legal framework within which the organisations were accustomed to operating 
disappeared with the outbreak of war.  War-time legislation had a cross-cutting impact that in 
principle affected all four organisations equally.  The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 
1939 was an enabling Act of Parliament passed ten days before the outbreak of the war; it 
enabled the Government, or to be precise, the King in Council, to devise and apply whatever 
Defence Regulations as were necessary ‘for securing the public safety, the defence of the 
realm, the maintenance of public order, and the efficient prosecution of the war.’2  It was in 
force for one year and then its powers expanded by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 
1940, which provided for annual extensions by parliamentary resolution.  The powers would 
be in force until February 1946.  The Defence Regulations were Orders in Council and as 
such could amend any primary or secondary legislation within the limits set by the 
Emergency Powers Acts.  CPRE observed: ‘it will be seen that it confers absolute control 
over all persons and all property;’3 this proved to be no exaggeration.  In the year after the 
1940 Act, 2,000 separate orders were issued.4  Much to NSAS’ chagrin, the powers given to 
                                                 
2 W.I. Jennings, ‘The Emergency Powers (Defence) (No. 2) Act, 1940,’ Modern Law Review, (Vol. 4, 2, 
October 1940, pp.132-136), p.132 
3 CPRE War-time Progress Report and Annual Report 1939, (Vol. XIII No.1), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), p.7   
4 U. Buchan, A Green and Pleasant Land: how England's gardeners fought the Second World War, 
(Hutchinson, 2013), p.25 
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local authorities to control excessive smoke emissions were rescinded5 and as we shall see, 
industry was soon expressly required by the State to produce more smoke (p.19 above and 
p.94 below).  Whilst there was no power for the compulsory acquisition through ownership of 
land, there was compulsory requisition over the course of the war of 14.5 million acres of 
land, 25 million square feet of industrial and storage premises, and 113,350 non-industrial 
premises.6  The consultation processes initiated by Chamberlain as noted above (p.66) were 
thus not something that the Defence Departments were legally obliged to undertake, 
particularly given they were the result of an initiative undertaken by a previous Prime 
Minister during peace-time.   
 
4.1.1  CPRE 
Nine days after the British Government’s declaration of war on Germany, CPRE’s EC met.  
The minutes of the meeting record no discussion as to whether the organisation should keep 
going, or whether it was supportive of the war effort, or against it because of the damage to 
the rural environment which would result.  Indeed, it would perhaps have been surprising if 
there had been any such discussion; as noted above (p.53) there was a strong strand of 
patriotism in CPRE’s work and as we saw in Chapter Three (p.58) the organisation’s aims 
and objectives had been become accustomed to war-related demands since early 1936, the 
beginning of the long war.  Its main decision at this meeting was to pass an “Emergency 
Committee” resolution, which invested control and administration of CPRE in a ‘War 
Emergency Committee’ (WEC), ‘for the period of hostilities and for not more than for six 
months thereafter.’7  It was reported at the meeting that branches were ‘definitely waiting for 
                                                 
5 NSAS 14th Annual Report 1944, (WL SA/EPU/E/1/1), p.6 
6 National Archives, The Legislative Framework for Requisitioning (online resource) 
7 CPRE WEC Minutes 12/9/1939, (MERL SR CPRE A/1/5)   
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a lead from Headquarters as to procedure in time of war’8 and it was agreed that the Secretary 
should circulate a letter to all branches to the effect that: 
 
the Executive Committee at HQ were unanimously of the opinion that the work of the 
Council should be carried on during war on however small a scale as they think it 
would contribute to the morale of the country.9   
 
Regrettably no copy of this letter survives, at least not in CPRE’s HQ archives, but the 
organisation published its war-time position and priorities in July 1940; it was patriotic but 
combative: 
 
the threats to rural England that have arisen owing to the national crisis and the war 
have of course been greatly intensified. It is inevitable that while the very existence of 
the nation is at stake, all else must take second place. Nevertheless it is the considered 
opinion of the CPRE that the importance of safeguarding the English countryside has 
been increased rather than diminished in time of war. The Council’s work is therefore 
of increasing importance.10 
 
Frustratingly for the historian, but understandably for the period, and to protect its privileged 
position and reputation as a confidante, CPRE was publically circumspect about the detail of 
its work; it is clear from looking at the long archival series of EC minutes that it was being 
actively consulted on a large number of defence and other government department proposals 
through, for example, the Air Ministry/Abercrombie conduit and consultative mechanisms 
with the Ministry of Works and Buildings with regard to the siting of Royal Ordnance 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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10 CPRE War-time Progress Report and Annual Report 1939, pp. 30-31 
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Factories.  These back-channel mechanisms held up for some time into the war, even though 
the architect of them, Chamberlain, was no longer Prime Minister by May 1940, and was 
dead by the end of that year.  In 1945, in a letter to The Times, the CPRE Secretary H.G. 
Griffin reflected that ‘as the urgency and volume of the country’s war needs developed, 
however, this procedure tended to fall into abeyance.’11  As CPRE was keen to state during 
the war, whenever these mechanisms were not always initially adhered to, ‘the undertaking 
was precise and has never been revoked.’12  CPRE also had a policy platform for engaging 
with the military and civil servants in these departments.  ‘CPRE Policy in War-time’13 
consisted of a five-point plan encompassing, in the order in which CPRE stipulated them: 
agricultural development, the facilitation of Service (Defence and defence-related 
government) Departments’ needs, rural industries, social amenities for rural populations, and 
national parks.  As such they were an accurate representation of what CPRE would be 
actively engaged on for the next five years.  With agricultural development CPRE’s major 
pre-occupation, it would seem to have done (or been able to do in the war-time 
circumstances) little to encourage “bona fide”14 rural industries, other than by resisting 
industrial ventures which it judged to be trying to inveigle their way into rural areas under 
cover of the war.  Its priority of ‘constant vigilance in potential national parks’15 would be 
two-fold: firstly, as an implacable opponent of any Defence Department intention to site 
themselves in proposed national park areas, and secondly, it was a determined advocate of 
national parks as part of the post-war settlement.  Related to this, and not articulated by the 
organisation, was the cross-cutting theme that ran through all its work from a relatively early 
stage: that of post-war reconstruction, particularly in relation to the restitution and restoration 
of requisitioned land when the war was over. 
                                                 
11 The Times, ‘Military Use Of  Land,’ 8/8/1945, p. 5 
12 CPRE War-time Progress Report and Annual Report 1939 (Vol. XIII No.1), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), p.7 
13 Ibid., p.6 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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4.1.2  The National Trust 
The Trust’s EC anticipated the forthcoming war by a couple of months, determining at its 
July 1939 meeting that if war broke out there would be a concentration of powers, and in 
October the Trust’s governing Council (to which the EC was accountable) agreed by letter 
that a fixed group of people should serve as the EC for the duration of the war;16 further, sub-
committees would meet with fewer people and less regularly. 
 
In mid-1940, around the same time as CPRE issued its policy, the Trust issued ‘The Trust in 
War-Time’, an eight-page pamphlet in response to ‘so many members…[having]…inquired 
what we are doing and how we are getting on that this small leaflet has been printed for 
circulation.’17  Similarly to CPRE, it struck a balance between patriotism and a combative 
awareness of being taken advantage of in the fog of the war effort:  
 
war needs have brought new uses for properties which cannot reasonably be 
resisted…anti-aircraft batteries, searchlight companies and balloon barrages want 
sites; billets are wanted for troops and homes for evacuated children…demands are 
put forward that farmland and downland should be ploughed and that timber should 
be felled for war purposes… [but] …there are, moreover, those who would use war as 
a pretext or cover for arbitrary, bureaucratic or unnecessary action which would in 
normal times meet with an outcry…against action of this kind the Trust must be ever 
on the watch, determined to meet it with vigorous opposition. This is being done, 
though it is obviously undesirable to give particulars in this leaflet.18 
 
                                                 
16 NT Council Minutes, 10/1939, NT HQ archive 
17 ‘The Trust in War-time,’ (MERL SR CPRE C/1/49/107), p.1 
18 Ibid. p.3 
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In the Trust’s 1939/1940 Annual Report, issued around the same time, it was more to the 
point: 
 
The Trust’s foremost aim in wartime must be to survive the war with its buildings in 
sound repair, with its farms productive and in good order, with the beauty of its 
woodlands and open spaces unspoiled.19 
 
Two years later, in its 1941-1942 Annual Report, the Trust made a short statement which 
established some clear blue water between it and CPRE:  
 
the primary object of the Trust in the case of lands held for the benefit of the nation … 
must always be preservation of natural beauty. Agricultural use must remain a 
secondary though important consideration.20 
 
This did not however lead to any discernible public (or private) disagreements or problems 
between the two organisations.  The reality was that CPRE had a wider brief, whereas the 
Trust was constrained by its founding legislation to protect that property (buildings and land) 
that it owned, rather than seek to hold the whole of rural England close to its breast.  Further, 
as previously observed (p.16) the war represented good business for the Trust; this was due to 
the cumulative effects of increases in war-time taxation and death duties, the lack of funds for 
capital investment in property to enable existing owners to continue living in their properties, 
and as in the First World War due to conscription, a lack of sons to oversee the management 
of properties, and a lack of staff to keep estates well maintained.  The Manchester Guardian 
reported in July 1941 that the Trust had acquired so much land since the beginning of the war 
                                                 
19 NT Annual Report 1940/41, (NT HQ archive), p.4 
20 NTAnnual Report 1941/42, (NT HQ archive), pp.8-9 
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that by the end of 1941 it would own or protect 100,000 acres,21 compared with 60,000 acres 
in 1937, as noted above (p.48). 
 
From 1943 onwards the Trust’s Country House Scheme, introduced in 1937 and met at the 
time with little immediate enthusiasm by that fragment of the population with country houses, 
began to prove an attractive mechanism through which to dispose tax-efficiently of buildings 
of cultural significance.  As a result, the Trust’s EC minutes increasingly focused on its 
property acquisitions; EC minutes of 1942 onwards barely mention issues relating to the war, 
and the Trust’s 1944-1945 Annual Report does not mention the war at all.  Even before this 
time the more mundane would regularly sit surreally in the minutes next to a consideration of 
a Defence Department’s interest in a Trust land or property holdings: “Mr Sanderson’s offer 
of a gate-legged table, a console table and a writing table was accepted subject to steps being 
taken to treat the worm in them.’22   
 
We can see from the above that the Trust’s activities in addressing the impact of war on the 
rural landscape were constrained by its legal requirement to focus its activities on that 
property that it owned.  This limited its capacity to cooperate with CPRE, and restricted its 
views on war-time agricultural development to matters which directly affected its own 
properties.  It also became increasingly preoccupied with receiving bequests of properties 
from owners hard-pressed by war-time strictures. 
 
4.1.3  National Smoke Abatement Society 
In 1941 NSAS confided to its affiliates in its Eleventh Annual Report that it had at first 
feared at the outbreak of war that it might need to suspend its activities, but ‘the unexpected 
                                                 
21 Manchester Guardian, ‘Saving Historic Country Houses: the National Trust’s scheme in action,’ 29/7/1941, 
p.6 
22 NT EC Minutes 12/2/1940, (NT HQ archive), p.2223 
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continuation of comparatively normal conditions during the early months of the war’ (the so-
called “phoney war”) made it possible to carry out some useful work, with the expectation 
that the organisation would work almost entirely by post and through publications and other 
writing.23 
 
Based on the available archival material of all four organisations, NSAS’ decision making 
regarding continuing its activities during the war differed in two significant ways to its three 
counterparts in this dissertation.  Firstly, it recognised explicitly in its publications that the 
outbreak of war could impact on how the organisation worked; in its Winter 1939-1940 
Smokeless Air journal it recognised that:   
 
although the war in many ways limits our progress as a propaganda organisation, it 
should be possible for us to work more actively on the lines of a scientific society that 
is concerned with the study of one specific subject.24   
 
Secondly, NSAS included a degree of democratic discussion amongst its members as to the 
direction the organisation should take.  On 2nd April 1940 the Council met in Manchester 
with a conference session open to members, with the principal subject of discussion being 
smoke abatement during the war; about sixty people attended, a figure ‘higher than had been 
thought likely at the present time.’25  Dr Jervis, as noted above [page reference] proposed 
(possibly one suspects for the purposes of debate and as a devil’s advocate service on behalf 
of the governing Council) three possible responses for NSAS:  
 
                                                 
23 NSAS, Eleventh Annual Report 1941, (WL SA/EPU/E/1/1),  p.13 
24 NSAS Smokeless Air, No.2 Winter 1939-40, (Vol. X, No.40), ( WL SA/EPU/H/1/2/1/2), p.3 ‘War and Peace 
Aims’ 
25 NSAS Smokeless Air, No.3, Spring 1940, (Vol XI, No.41), (WL SA/EPU/H/1/2/2), p.8 
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a) …close the doors and conserve the Society’s resources so that they will be intact 
and available at the end of the war;  
b) continue the work but with a modified programme…confining our efforts to 
“ticking over” with an occasional “rev up” just to prove …that the Society is still 
alive; and; 
c) carry on as if nothing had happened, indeed if possible with more intensity, 
particularly in the direction of industrial smoke, which is likely to get worse rather 
than better as the war proceeds.26   
 
Jervis favoured what he felt was the third, and boldest policy, and this carried the day.  A 
resolution was adopted by the Council at its 18th April meeting focusing on: ‘the gross and 
expensive waste causing and caused by the smoke nuisance…[and]…the waste of fuel and 
power of which smoke is the direct consequence;’27 the resolution went on to voice NSAS’ 
anxiety over the deterioration in atmospheric conditions that had in its view already occurred 
since the war began, and as a result the EC declared that NSAS would no longer restrict its 
activities.28  However, the EC did not then meet for nearly three years, from May 1940 until 
April 1943. 
All of this democracy may possibly have been a mechanism for mobilising the membership, 
as NSAS had already published its Smoke Abatement in Wartime: A Statement by the 
National Smoke Abatement Society nine-page pamphlet three months previously; in so doing 
it was in advance of CPRE and the National Trust by some months.  Over the course of the 
war NSAS wore its heart on its sleeve, with its views on its own usefulness seemingly ebbing 
                                                 
26 Ibid, p.10 
27 NSAS EC Minutes 18/4/1940, (WL SA/EPU/A/3), ‘Resolution on Policy’ 
28 Ibid. 
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and flowing with the tide of the war. In the Autumn 1939 edition of its journal it assessed 
that: 
 
some progressive bodies will find their work vastly increased as a result of the war; 
others will have to mark time until peace returns. Smoke abatement, at first sight, 
seemed to be one of the unfortunates...[but]…new lines of useful and necessary 
activity are already becoming apparent29 
 
Its 1939 to 1940 Annual Report continued to be resolute and optimistic: ‘whatever it is 
feasible and useful to do will therefore be done,’30 but just six months later, when Britain had 
been under almost daily aerial attack for some months, it stated: ‘it is a pity that the 
conditions of war should relegate smoke abatement to a comparative, though only temporary, 
obscurity.’31    
 
In a similar way to CPRE using the importance of agricultural land to the war effort as a 
means to seek to fend off Defence Department requisitioning of such land for airfields and 
other purposes, the NSAS sought to further its cause for smoke emission reduction by 
promoting the need for fuel efficiency during the war, positioning itself as a resource for the 
Government, offering technical advice at national and regional level as well as promoting the 
services of local smoke inspectors, rationalising that since smoke was an indication of the 
partial, and therefore wasteful, combustion of bituminous coal, smoke abatement was of 
direct assistance to the war effort as it would conserve coal stocks.32  Further, it used the war 
to argue for one of its pre-war policies, that of a National Fuel Policy to coordinate the 
                                                 
29 NSAS Smokeless Air, No.1 Autumn 1939, (WL SA/EPU/H/1/2/1/2), p.1, 
30 NSAS Tenth Annual Report 1939-1940, (WL SA/EPU/E/1/1), p.2 
31 NSAS Smokeless Air,  No.6, Winter 1940-1941, (Vol XI, No.44), (WL SA/EPU/H/1/2/1/2), p.74 
32 ‘Smoke Abatement in Wartime: a statement by the National Smoke Abatement Society,’(WL SA/EPU/H/4/1), 
p.4 
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development and uses of different fuels and plan the utilisation of all fuel resources and 
productive capacity, ‘the desirability…[of which]…is made still more marked as a result of 
conditions arising out of the war.’33  NSAS would, however, be less successful in employing 
this tactic than CPRE, for as shall be explored in detail below (p.94), Ministry of Home 
Security policy would take the issue of smoke emissions in the entirely opposite direction 
between 1940 and 1943, much to NSAS’ frustration and opposition. 
 
NSAS’ fluctuating views of its potential to be active during the war illustrate the uncertainty 
of the time, and its attempts to promote an issue such as fuel efficiency indicate how it sought 
to make progress on issues which were at least in principle compatible with the successful 
conduct of the war effort. 
 
4.1.4  Pure Rivers Society 
Although PRS’ archive is deficient in many respects when compared with those of its 
counterparts in this dissertation, unlike CPRE and NT, the minutes of its first EC meeting 
after war was declared record a degree of discussion about what the organisation should do in 
war-time, rather than just record decisions, or imply that there was no discussion at all: 
 
the subject of what should be the Society’s attitude during the war was discussed.  A 
letter was read from Mr Wells…saying that he thought the Society should close down.  
Mrs Lemon had also written…expressing satisfaction that the Society was still 
functioning…after some discussion it was unanimously decided to carry on and to 
hold the usual monthly meetings.34 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p.9 
34 PRS EC Minutes, 21/9/1939, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.122 
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Unlike the other three organisations, there is no indication that PRS produced any kind of 
war-time policy statement; this could be because of its smaller capacity, or because one was 
produced but has not survived.  Whichever, it is clear from material that does survive (p.122 
below) that it felt war-time water pollution was inevitable and impractical to contest, so all of 
PRS’ focus should be on securing a place for addressing inland water pollution as part of the 
post-war reconstruction settlement.  Clearly the lack of organisational capacity was much 
more keenly felt at PRS than any of the other three organisations.  It is logical to surmise that 
this was instrumental in determining to what extent inland water pollution related to the war 
effort could be addressed during war-time. 
 
The corollary of what organisations said they were going to do, was what they said they 
would no longer do; NT and NSAS both gave some indication as to what they would be de-
prioritising.  NSAS acknowledged that the issue of domestic smoke abatement would have to 
wait until the post-war period, as it was ‘inevitably overshadowed by the urgent problems 
arising out of the war;’35 for NT the change was a very practical one and not all bad, as it 
redirected its efforts from raising funds in order to purchase properties and land on a pro-
active basis, to receiving bequests.36 
 
Thus support for the war effort by all four organisations was a given, or at least if there was 
any discussion as to their respective positions, then it was decided not to minute them.  The 
stated war-time positions are important, but do not necessarily reflect what the organisations 
were subsequently able to focus on; this was a period of great uncertainty and volatility, and 
it could not even be foreseen for the initial years of the war that Britain would not be 
                                                 
35 ‘Smoke Abatement in Wartime’, p.6 
36 NT Annual Report 1940/41, (NT HQ archive), p.4 
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conquered by Nazi Germany.  Interestingly there is not the slightest mention of what invasion 
and defeat would mean for the organisations’ respective missions. 
 
The next part of this chapter will focus on those impacts on the environment and landscape 
that these organisations acquiesced to, which they were active in opposition to, and a smaller 
number of instances where the interests of the war-time Coalition Government converged 
with the missions of the organisations. 
 
4.2  Convergence of Interest, Acquiescence and Opposition  
The setting and implementation of policy during the long war period by the CPRE, NT, 
NSAS and PRS in support of their mission statements was an exercise in the art of the 
possible, and led to relative acquiescence in some areas and tangible, consistent opposition in 
others.  Here I identify four areas where there was significant acquiescence at least for a 
certain period of the war, and five areas where there was at least some degree of opposition 
by the organisations during the long war period; as evidenced by these caveats, the issue of 
acquiescence or opposition was rarely a black and white issue.  As I intend to show, the 
difference between the two approaches was due to external war-related factors, i.e. the state 
of the conduct of the war, the perceived centrality of the issue to the war-time effort vis-à-vis 
what would now be called “red line” issues for the organisations, and on a more practical, 
organisational level, the very real obstacles to activity of reduced staff and financial 
resources, and the absence of usual routes of influence, firstly via advocacy through political 
contacts in Parliament due to war-time restrictions on public debate, and secondly due to 
press interest being primarily focused on the conduct of the war. 
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In 1943 CPRE declared that it ‘sought to have a reputation with government for “competent 
and reasonable representations”,’37 which suggests an approach with a realistic and balanced 
appraisal of any given potential issue CPRE might take up; this represents a continuation and 
formalisation of its position at the start of the long war period (p.65 above).  As if to 
underline this, in the same report, under a section rather euphemistically called ‘Changes in 
the Countryside,’ it summarised the impact of the war across a range of environmental 
dimensions: the loss of previously unspoilt farm land as a result of the dispersal of existing 
industry and the establishment of new industry, together with the necessary accommodation 
buildings for the workers, and the construction of airfields, camps and defence works; the 
wholesale alteration of extensive coastal areas and their hinterlands due to the designation of 
Defence Areas; the breaking up of woodlands and private parklands in the search for all types 
of timber; a (dramatic) increase in open-cast mining; and lastly, an increase in the pollution of 
rivers and streams.38  In contrast to all the bad news, with CPRE an advocate of agricultural 
development since its inception (p.26 above), the organisation was able to state that: ‘the 
effects of the war upon the countryside have not, however, been wholly bad’39 as a result of 
the ‘great stimulation’40 given to agriculture.   
 
In between acquiescence and opposition was a narrow band of cultural and educational 
activity where the agenda of the war-time Coalition Government was compatible with CPRE 
and the National Trust; this chapter looks at this convergence first. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 CPRE War-time Progress Report September 1942-1943, p.15  
38 Ibid, p.4 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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4.2.1  Convergence of Interest 
In the winter of 1939-40 Sir Kenneth Clark, both Director of the National Gallery and Head 
of the MOI’s Film Division, initiated the ‘Scheme for Recording the Changing Face of 
Britain’ (known more succinctly as ‘Recording Britain’).  Gill Saunders considers that the 
scheme ‘was constructed as an account of “Englishness”,’ as out of the resulting 1,549 
topographical water-colour drawings and painting of places and buildings characteristic of 
national interest and potentially under threat by the war, the vast majority were of England.41   
CPRE and NT were both asked for lists of places suitable for drawing and painting.42  The 
project’s immediate priorities were determined by the threat of invasion particularly around 
Southern England; where possible, artists were despatched ‘before the county was occupied 
by the British, or the German, Army,’43 and one artist was urgently sent ‘to record an avenue 
of beech trees…about to be cut down to make way for an aerodrome.’44  The project ended in 
1943 with the threat of invasion having declined. 
 
4.2.2  Acquiescence 
I now consider four areas where between them CPRE, NT and PRS decided to largely 
acquiesce to State activities in support of the war effort, despite their impact on the 
environment and landscape: coastal defences, inland water pollution, open-cast mining, and 
the felling of woodlands. 
 
4.2.2.1  The Coast and Defence Works 
As noted in Chapter One, the coast, mainly around the East and South of England, was 
hastily protected at the outset of war by a “coastal crust” (p.13 above) of defences which 
                                                 
41 . G. Saunders, Recording Britain, (V&A Publishing, 2011), p.9 
42 Ibid,p.10 and 14 
43 Pilgrim Trust, Recording Britain, Vol. 2, (Oxford University Press/Pilgrim Trust, 1946), p.1 
44 Ibid, p.72 
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extended several miles inland; in effect however, the entire coastline of Britain was 
requisitioned by the armed forces and to various extents defensive measures installed.  
Despite a tactical rethink in 1941, which caused these measures to be more tailored to the 
topography and likely routes of attempted penetration by an invading force, the vulnerability 
of Britain’s coastal areas was both so obvious and emblematic of Britain’s need to defend 
itself that I could find no evidence in CPRE or NT archives that these measures were in any 
way contested.  Again though, this acquiescence did not reflect ignorance, as in its War-time 
Progress Report for July 1940-July 1941, CPRE recognised that: 
 
of all the problems facing those engaged in preparations for post-war reconstruction, 
the coast will present one of the most difficult. No other part of the country has 
suffered so much from the construction of Defence Works of all kinds.45   
 
By the following year, mid-1942, CPRE was clear that: 
 
the occupation of coastal lands by government departments under Defence 
Regulations for purposes of national defence must be terminated at the earliest 
possible date after the war…[and]…buildings and other structures erected in 
connection therewith removed and the land restored to its former condition.46 
 
This indicates that the post-war settlement in respect of redressing the damage done to 
environment and landscape was very much on the minds of CPRE, even before the point at 
which Allied victory was assured.   
 
                                                 
45 CPRE War-time Progress Report July, 1940-July 1941, Vol. XIII, No.2, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), p.12 
46  CPRE War-time Progress Report August 1941-August 1942, Vol. XIII, No.3, (MERL SR CPRE B/2/13), 
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4.2.2.2  Water Pollution and Industry 
Cordite was fundamental to the whole ammunition programme,47 and huge quantities of 
water were required so drainage and water supply were of great importance; cordite factories 
were located near inland waterways so the effluent could be discharged into them ‘without 
elaborate treatment…so it had no effect on taste or fitness for consumption.’48  This was 
known to PRS; in a fundraising letter sent out to other organisations in June 1940 (so it is fair 
to say they would not have wanted to under-state the situation), PRS set out its analytical stall 
for how water pollution in war-time Britain would get worse.  It is further indicative of the 
shadow that the First World War cast over these organisations: 
 
during the war of 1914-1918 there was an enormous increase of pollution which it has 
taken years of hard and persistent work to reduce and already there are many signs 
that we are threatened by a similar disaster during the present war.  Mine owners, 
manufacturers and others are seeking to make the war an excuse for fresh pollutions 
or for failing to purify their effluents and trade wastes before discharging them into 
rivers and streams, while sewage pollution is increasing owing to the stopping of 
construction or improvement of disposal plants.49 
 
As noted above (p.82) the capacity of the organisation and its constituencies of support to 
address inland water pollution was a key issue, together with the problems in undertaking 
Parliamentary advocacy work.  PRS’ Council discussed at length on 16th November 1939 the 
possibility of utilising Anglers Societies to campaign against water pollution, but it was noted 
                                                 
47 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries: a history, Vol. II the first quarter century 1926-1952, (Oxford 
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48 Hornby, History, p.115 
49 Council Minutes, 16/5/1940, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.134 
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that many such clubs and societies were ‘at a standstill’50 due to the war.  At a further 
Council meeting in March 1940 Parliamentary lobbying was discussed, and the Secretary was 
instructed to approach Members of Parliament interested in pollution to ask them to ask 
questions in the House regarding the anti-pollution efforts of the Ministry of Health and local 
authorities, and what precautions were being taken by munitions factories to prevent the 
pollution of rivers and streams they were sited next to.51  By May the PRS Secretary had 
identified MPs willing to ask these questions, but finding a suitable opportunity in Parliament 
proved problematic.52  Hansard does not show that any of these questions were subsequently 
asked. 
 
PRS received Pollution Reports from its diminished network of members and supporters 
around Britain into 1941 and possibly for the duration of the war, although regrettably none 
have survived the subsequent filleting of the organisation’s archives.  Its Council meeting in 
February 1941 noted the contents of the latest Pollution Reports but: ‘agreed that no action 
should be taken other than recording them for reconsideration and appropriate action after the 
war.’53 
 
4.2.2.3  Open-Cast Coal Mining 
Deep-mine coal mining was the main-stay of Britain’s energy production prior to the war, 
and as such its continuation during the war, albeit to power war-time rather than peace-time 
industry, means that its environmental impact during the war is not a factor for consideration 
in this dissertation; this is certainly not to say however that it was environmentally benign.  
What was a direct consequence of war-time imperatives for new sources of energy was the 
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52 PRS Council Minutes, 16/5/1940, p.133 
53 PRS Council Minutes, 20/2/1941, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.142 
87 
 
introduction and then rapid development of open-cast mining; with mining manpower at a 
premium given the demands of the armed forces, one ton of open-cast coal could be quarried 
with only one quarter of the labour force needed for a ton of coal from a deep-mine colliery.54  
The war-time Coalition Government assumed total responsibility for open-cast coal mining, 
and production rose from 1,311 thousand tons in 1942 to 8,115 thousand tons by 1945,55 
accounting for roughly 5% of Britain’s total coal output.56  By the War’s end open-cast 
mining cut swathes across West and South-West Wales, and in England across the Midlands, 
North-West and North-East.57  
 
Open-cast mining only required temporary use of the land from which coal was extracted, but 
the restoration of land was not a compulsory requirement for the Government until 1943.58  
According to R.T Arguile, until this time the view regarding open-cast mining was that 
Britain was in ‘…a life and death struggle…with the Axis Powers and meeting the demand 
for fuel had first priority.  The refinements of land restoration were yet to be considered.’59  
CPRE’s original and general position was one of acquiescence, even when CPRE’s Secretary 
was prompted by a tip-off from a supportive civil servant at the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning: 
 
My dear Griffin, I hear from an official source that there is some danger of damage to 
amenities by open-cast coal mining at two Lancashire places – Winstanley Hall…and 
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Standish Hall…you may like to set discrete enquiries on foot…don’t mention me! 
Yours ever, John.60 
 
CPRE Lancashire branch duly took the matter up with the Ministry of Fuel and Power,61 but 
the lack of evidence in the archives suggests that this was an isolated intervention.  
Commenting in early 1944, with restoration now compulsory, CPRE felt open-cast mining 
was: ‘understood to be free from criticism on agricultural grounds’ due to the restoration 
provisions.62  Only as the war was ending did CPRE become more engaged on the 
environmental implications of open-cast mining when the slow and inadequate restoration of 
land became apparent.  CPRE found that some sites had not been restored satisfactorily, 
although it felt that in many cases land had been improved as better drainage had resulted, 
therefore making the land better suited to agriculture.  However, out of a total area used for 
open-cast mining during the war of 19,370 acres, less than 10% of this had been restored by 
war’s end.63 With the Ministry of Agriculture still struggling to identify improved methods of 
restoration, by 1947 CPRE’s position would harden as some of its constituencies of support 
became increasingly dissatisfied.64 
 
4.2.2.4  Woodlands and Timber Production 
Wooden pit props were essential for coal mines, sleepers for the railway network, and for the 
rapid construction of buildings and engineering works; the Air Force needed certain types of 
wood for plane construction, the Admiralty wood for boat and harbour construction, and the 
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Army wood for rifle butts and gun carriage wheels.65  With supplies cut off from Norway 
once the country fell to the Nazis, and with timber so bulky to transport in comparison with 
other much needed war materials, it was necessary for Britain to become as self-sufficient as 
possible in its timber supplies; yet in 1939 only 4% of the timber that Britain used was 
domestically produced.66  Sourcing timber from domestic woodlands enabled Britain to 
provide 60% of its needs across the war’s duration,67 with domestic production increasing 
from an average of 450,000 tons p.a. in the 1935-38 period to a peak of 3,821,000 tons in 
1943.68   
 
England would contribute two-thirds of total British production of timber during the war.69  
The burden fell on privately owned woodland, which accounted for around 92% of fellings,70 
predominantly beech, oak and elm.  In 1942 1,800 acres of woods were being felled every 
week.71 By 1946 two-thirds of timber standing in British woodlands in 1939 had been felled 
to meet war-time needs.72 
 
The official policy of the Coalition Government’s specially created Home Timber Production 
Department of the Ministry of Supply was to reserve stands of timber and individual trees 
which were of special public amenity, providing the nation’s essential war-time needs could 
be met.  This was difficult to implement, as the information on the felling licences issued 
gave no indication of the amenity value of trees proposed to be felled, so staff were unlikely 
to know unless they happened to have local knowledge.  According to Meiggs, in the absence 
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of a working mechanism CPRE ‘often filled the void,’73 but my study of CPRE’s archives 
does not indicate a sustained engagement with the issue, and there was generally more 
acquiescence and resignation to the inevitability of the gradual degrading of Britain’s 
woodlands.  In 1939 CPRE stated sombrely: ‘since the invasion of Norway, it seems 
inevitable that practically all available timber will be felled…sacrifices will be necessary,’74 
and ‘there is no doubt if felling is continued at the present rate the country will be to all 
intents and purposes denuded of timber.’75  CPRE’s War Emergency Committee did however 
state that there should be strict insistence on replanting, and the saving, if possible, of a 
certain number of trees in order to facilitate natural regeneration,76 but there is no further 
evidence in the archives of regular activity on this issue until later in the war, when the 
balance between war-time timber production and the amenity value of woodland was brought 
into sharper focus as the war dragged on, and with a corresponding diminution of timber.  In 
May 1944 the Manchester Guardian lamented the imminent loss of a beech wood on 
Latkhkill Dale, Derbyshire77 but later in the month the paper was able to report triumphantly 
that the beech trees had won a permanent reprieve thanks to representations made by CPRE’s 
HQ and its Sheffield and Peak District Branch.78  By 1944 NT was adopting a similarly stern 
line to the further exploitation of woods on its properties, with its Estates Committee deciding 
that January not to recommend handing over the management of any NT woodlands to the 
Forestry Commission.  ‘Grave doubts were expressed…[by several committee 
members]…and the Committee decided not to advise the dedication of any woods without 
further consideration.’79 
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It can be seen from the above that organisations did not challenge actions by the State where 
the direct defence of the nation was at stake (in the case of coastal defences), and in relation 
to activities in direct support of the war effort, namely munitions factories, the generation of 
sufficient timber, and labour-efficient means of coal production.  With the prolonged duration 
of the war however the positions of both CPRE and NT hardened in respect of the latter two 
issues: CPRE when the failure to restore open-cast mining sites prejudiced agriculture, and 
both CPRE and the Trust when the continued diminution of Britain’s woodland reached 
limits that they felt demanded an end to their acquiescence. 
 
4.2.3  Opposition 
I now consider four areas where between them NSAS, CPRE and NT determined to oppose 
to varying degrees State activities in support of the war effort because of the impact the 
activities had on issues which were of concern to the respective organisations: atmospheric 
pollution, elements of general land use, rural locations of special value, and war-time 
preparations for the post-war period. 
 
4.2.3.1  Atmospheric Pollution From Industrial Smoke Emissions 
The overall assessment of levels of atmospheric pollution was not clear during the war, to 
NSAS’ frustration.  In the immediate pre-war period the nationwide network of measuring 
devices overseen by the Government’s Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
showed the condition of Britain’s atmosphere was improving,80 but the full results to which 
NSAS had become accustomed in the inter-war period were not issued during the war, and 
the number of measuring instruments being maintained and monitored decreased in war-
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time81 as well.  Those summary results that were issued showed modest upward and 
downward fluctuations in certain pollutants82 83 over the course of the war, and one senses, 
although the NSAS was too diplomatic to state it, that the organisation was doubtful of the 
accuracy of the summary results due to the reduced measuring capacity, and also because 
some NSAS supporters gave their own anecdotal evidence of increased atmospheric pollution 
as a result of war-effort related industry, most notably speakers from Leeds, Sheffield, 
Manchester and Halifax at NSAS’ conference in April 1940.84 
 
Whilst being aware of at least regional increases in atmospheric pollution from the outbreak 
of war, NSAS was still hopeful in the early stage of the war in arguing to government that it 
was in the interests of the war effort to use coal-burning boilers and furnaces more efficiently, 
and thereby achieve a reduction in smoke emissions.  However, NSAS’ aspirations received a 
significant blow in June 1940 when Home Security Circular “Production of extra smoke from 
industrial works” No.139/1940 was issued by the Smoke Production Division of the Ministry 
of Home Security to local authorities, requiring that: 
 
as a matter of urgency, arrangements should be made for all industrial works in your 
area to produce as much extra smoke as is feasible as a normal procedure, without 
incurring too much waste…but it is regarded as imperative in the national interests 
that any measures which may render industrial targets less readily definable from the 
air should be taken forthwith….as much dark smoke as is feasible…[should be 
produced]…without, as far as practicable, emitting noxious gases.85 
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This was followed less than a month later informing the same local authorities that: 
 
it has been decided to provide, as a matter of extreme urgency, special smoke 
protection during periods of moonlight for a number of industrial undertakings in 
different parts of the country. Smoke protection schemes, which will involve the 
emission of smoke from a large number of smoke-producing units, will be devised 
and put into operation for a large number of areas as quickly as possible…during the 
next period of moonlight, commencing on July 14th.86 
 
This was further followed by a circular in August requiring that smoke emissions be 
increased in certain key areas by non-industrial premises, but not private homes.87  The 
issuing of the circulars caused great consternation at NSAS; it was a backward step which 
both used up fuel inefficiently in order to create extra smoke, and increased atmospheric 
pollution.  As a result perhaps, it crossed the line that usually held amongst the four 
organisations, that of not being critical of Government departments on military grounds; its 
view was that a pall of smoke would be more likely to endanger a densely populated or 
industrial area by advertising its presence, rather than obscure it from the Luftwaffe’s 
bombing sights, and one smoke plume might betray the presence of an isolated factory that 
might otherwise be unnoticed.88 
 
Regrettably no material has survived in NSAS’ archive of the representations it made to the 
Government, but its Summer 1943 journal NSAS commented tantalisingly that:  
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 We have been very reticent, as we were asked to be, in discussing this peculiar and 
difficult problem, and no report has been made of the Society’s representations to the 
Government in 1940 and again this year89 
 
NSAS would not be completely silent however, and pursued a modest commercial route to 
counter the State-encouraged increased smoke emissions, running adverts for ‘Coalite’ in its 
journal, making the not unreasonable point that palls of smoke would make it as difficult for 
the RAF to find enemy bombers and fighters as it would the latter to find their targets. 
 
 
 
[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
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The Ministry’s measures remained in place for nearly three years, until February 1943, at 
which point the previous circulars were revoked as fuel efficiency was now a greater 
imperative, whilst the Ministry held to its original assertion that the generation of more 
smoke had been an effective tactic against enemy bombers.91 
 
4.2.3.2  Land Use: agricultural, industrial, military 
On the eve of war in 1938-1939, due to factors explored in Chapter Two above, Britain had 
two million fewer acres of arable land being cultivated than it did at the outbreak of the First 
World War,92 from which British farmers produced only 30% of Britain’s food needs, 
compared with 80% in Nazi Germany.93  Britain would therefore be extremely vulnerable to 
the consequences of a curtailment in imported food supplies during any protracted war if it 
did not become more self-sufficient in food.  As a result the Emergency Powers (Defence) 
Act offered farmers £2 per acre to plough up fields that had been pasture for at least seven 
years; this brought into cultivation some of Britain’s most established pasture land.94  As 
noted above (p.14), in 1939 Britain had 11,870 thousand acres of land under arable 
cultivation, and 17,331 thousand acres was permanent grassland; in 1945 it had 17,866 
thousand acres arable to 10,892 grassland – practically a complete reversal.95  Consequently 
by 1944/45 food production had risen 91% and Britain was able to feed itself 160 days of the 
year rather than 120 when war broke out.96   
 
CPRE had a nuanced approach to the issue of land use which makes the categorisation of its 
position problematic for the purposes of dissertation structure.  On the one hand it was 
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supportive of government in its drive to bring an optimum amount of land under cultivation, 
so one could describe this as a convergence of interests.  On the other hand it opposed 
government if it sought to use agricultural land for other purposes.  CPRE thought that the 
use of unused land for agriculture, and the change in agricultural use from pasture to more 
valued arable production, were very positive developments, as they both protected the land 
against other forms of use, such as housing or industry, and developed the rural economy and 
society: ‘the constructive effect the war has had on agriculture is all to the good,’ it 
declared.97   
 
There was, however, a significant tension between different war-effort demands, and CPRE 
policy positioned the organisation on the fault line.  By 1944 over 11.5 million acres, or about 
20% of the surface area of England and Wales, was under military control.98  Whilst some of 
the land requisitioned by the military and other service departments was land only good for 
pasture, as noted in Chapter One above, airfields required flat, well-drained soil in specific 
locations, predominantly in the South-East and East Anglia, England’s arable heartland.  In 
keeping with its approach at the start of the long war (p.59), unless CPRE could suggest an 
alternative site to the Defence Departments then it would acquiesce to the loss of agricultural 
land, and focus on the restoration of that land to a rural purpose as part of the post-war 
settlement (p.59).   
 
As in peace-time, CPRE remained consistent throughout the long war in its opposition to and 
disdain for piecemeal, opportunistic industrial development in rural areas, opposing private 
firms moving into rural areas if suitable sites were available in more urban industrial zones; 
further, it was deeply suspicious of arguments for war-time industrial relocation which it 
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regarded as a Trojan horse for inappropriate economic development in rural areas.  On 13th 
August 1940 The Times reported on CPRE’s war-time policy statement: 
 
The Council intends to concentrate its activities so far as agricultural development is 
concerned to the safeguarding of all potentially productive land by the permanent 
restriction or prohibition of building on such land except in cases where building is 
urgently required in the national interests…the invasion of agricultural areas by 
industrial undertakings of a sporadic and speculative nature will be resisted.99 
 
There were sporadic incidents during the war that only served to validate CPRE’s position.  
In 1941 for example, in a case toxically mixing military imperative with business acumen, 
CPRE and other bodies opposed a development in the Lake District proposed by Butlin’s, 
which would have involved the holiday camp company building a camp for the Admiralty 
and then taking it over for leisure purposes at the end of the war.100  Utilising its 
“Chamberlain” mechanism with the Admiralty and its political contacts, CPRE was able to 
persuade the Admiralty to choose another less contentious site.   
 
Where it had a direct property interest NT was also prepared to intercede in Defence 
Department plans, and, with a narrower mandate than CPRE, stick tenaciously to protecting 
particular sites over the course of the war, taking ‘all possible steps to avoid the use by the 
Air Ministry of parts of Burwell and Wicken Fens in such a way as might for a long time 
seriously interfere with the scientific interest of the land.’101 
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4.2.3.3  War Effort Impact on England’s Finest Landscapes – Proposed “National Park” 
Territories 
For CPRE areas proposed during the inter-war period for national park status were red lines 
that could not be crossed both with regard to military requisitions and industrialisation: 
“some areas, like the Lake District, the Peak District and Snowdonia should be preserved 
inviolate,” it was to state categorically in mid-1941.102  The ‘CPRE Policy in War-time’ 
statement (p.74 above) committed the organisation to ‘continued cooperation’103 with regard 
to the Service Departments and the use of land, but also under ‘Rural Industries’ the 
‘encouragement of bona-fide rural industries…with adequate safeguards for their proper 
location, siting and design’ and most significantly under its fifth objective of National Parks: 
‘constant vigilance in potential national park areas.’104  The proposal, therefore, by the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940-1941 to site a seaplane production factory on the 
shores of Lake Windermere at Calgarth in the Lake District was the point at which these three 
CPRE war-time policies intersected, and it showed the organisation willing to test its 
relationship with the Government to the limit.  It was a fight that CPRE was, in terms of the 
involvement of national organisations, on its own.  CPRE sought to enlist the support of NT 
but in a letter from Matheson to Griffin in December 1940, the Trust Secretary admitted that: 
  
no National Trust properties are affected directly, though the proposal does of course 
involve a possible spoiling of the view from Wray Castle…[and]… as I dare say you 
appreciate…our hands are pretty full with things which affect us still more directly105 
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The NT was however active in the Lake District where it had property, undertaking political 
lobbying and legal action to protect Ullswater from discharges of polluting sediments from 
the Glenridding Lead Mine, run by a private company with a Ministry of Supply contract106 
 
This lack of support did not deter CPRE, which sought to use its full array of arguments and 
political and press contacts.  There was a rapid-fire exchange of letters between CPRE and 
various figures on the Government side and in the press, and they are quoted from generously 
below because within CPRE’s archives they stand out uniquely for the quantity of 
correspondence on one subject and the intense amount of effort that CPRE put into this single 
issue; whilst a more limited use of these arguments and connections occurred in other 
instances, on no other subject were they so comprehensively deployed. 
 
To Squadron Leader Keeling MP, who had a role in the War Cabinet Office and was a 
leading member of the supportive Parliamentary Amenities Group, Griffin wrote:  
 
my dear Keeling…as you know the CPRE have no desire to hinder any essential war 
effort but…presumably they would want to run the railway line from Windermere as 
far as…(the Ambleside end)…and this is a project which we have been against all our 
lives107   
 
On Griffin being advised that it was the Ministry of Aircraft Production that is responsible for 
the project:  
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I am astonished, in view of the late Prime Minister’s pledge to us which has never 
been abrogated, that we have not been consulted officially about this business at 
Windermere108 
 
This was followed, four days later, by: 
 
if I were in the House of Commons I would not hesitate to say that the proposal is a 
thoroughly bad one from a national point of view…to put a factory of this kind on a 
lake like Windermere is sheer madness, as, owing to the very peculiar shape of the 
lake, the site can be so very easily identified from the air and I prophecy that it will be 
bombed unmercifully and probably from great heights because of the difficult flying 
conditions…[next to another pre-war example]…it is probably the worst choice 
strategically that has yet been made…this one…is open to so much criticism from so 
many angles109 
 
A member of Ministry of Aircraft Production staff who had been lobbied by Keeling retorted:  
 
it would be madness to erect further buildings there…[at Rochester in Kent]…which 
had already been bombed…the product is a flying boat. A site on the edge of deep 
water is essential…[and] …we had a very thorough search made110 
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Griffin also sought to enlist the Editor of The Times: 
 
…I should be very much obliged to you if you could make enquiries about it, and, if 
possible, give the matter some publicity in the Times. I imagine you would be allowed 
discretion in so important a case as this…I do hope…you will find some way of using 
your great influence to bring pressure to bear on Lord Beaverbrook111 
 
In response the News Editor replied that an article was pending, ‘provided of course that we 
can get his message past the Censor.’112  Griffin also enlisted Abercrombie to lobby the 
Minister for Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbook, both in his capacity as consultant to the 
Air Ministry and as CPRE Chairman113 and warned in a letter to G.L. Pepler, a senior civil 
servant at the Ministry of Health, who had been a member of CPRE’s EC more or less since 
its inception:  
 
…really the Ministry of Aircraft Production or the Ministry of Supply or whoever it 
is, ought not to put inviting targets of this kind in…the Lake District. Surely there 
should be some place where people from the bombed urban districts can have 
comparative sanctuary…plenty of people, both outside and inside Parliament, are 
prepared to handle this matter…[Griffin then namedrops the local MP, the 
Archbishop of York and other Lords] …we are prepared to make a fine fuss…even in 
our present national emergency…after all, if we must fight, let us have something left 
to fight for114 
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This would prove something of a hollow threat as no question specifically about Calgarth 
would be allowed to be asked in either the House of Commons or Lords lest it gave away the 
position of the future seaplane factory to the enemy. All of this pressure did however elicit a 
response to CPRE from Lord Beaverbrook at the end of 1940:  
 
it is with extraordinary reluctance that we contemplate such a project…but it is 
essential for us to find a new site for a seaplane factory and conditions at Windermere 
seems to be so much more favourable than any we are likely to find elsewhere that 
our course seems to be imposed on us…we are concerned to provide the aircraft 
which will bring nearer the day of victory. Then peace and tranquillity will be 
restored to Lake Windermere and its temporary association with the aircraft industry 
will, happily, be at an end115 
 
The project went ahead.  
 
  
[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
use citation to locate the publication] 
 
 
Fig 7 DP176 seaplane ready to launch at the Windermere factory (courtesy of Allan King); (note Lake 
District hills to the left)116 
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[redacted illustration/photograph due to permission issue  
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Fig. 8 Aerial Photograph of Calgarth Estate, circa 1943 (courtesy of Lorna Pogson) 117  
  
Beaverbrook’s inference that the factory and temporary accommodation for workers would 
be taken away at the end of the war was seized on by CPRE and became a major plank of its 
efforts to ensure that requisitioned land tainted by war-time military or industrial activity was 
returned to its original use at the end of the war, as part of the post-war settlement.  CPRE 
may have tested its political allegiance and reputation for ‘competent and reasonable 
representations’ (p.84 above) to the point of destruction, but there was a logic to its actions.  
In September 1945 CPRE stated that it and others saw Calgarth as: 
 
a test case in the process of restoring rural England after the impact of war 
conditions… [and]… the Dower Report…[published May 1945] …“placed the Lake 
District among the first and essential areas to be recommended as a National Park118 
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The issue of what elements of the factory would be allowed to remain at Calgarth would 
feature regularly in CPRE EC minutes into the 1950s.  Such was the opposition of CPRE to 
the factory ever having been located in National Park-status territory that it continued to 
oppose the retention of the factory and housing estate even when immediately after the war 
there was local opinion in favour of retaining both.   
 
4.2.3.4  Lobbying for Influence Over The Post-War Settlement During War-time 
Mindful that First World War history did not repeat itself, settlement [reference Chapter 
One/Two pages], both CPRE and NT were extremely wary of requisitioned land not being 
restored to its pre-war use, and were appropriately active in their dealings with the 
Government, and specifically its Defence Departments.  The Manchester Guardian, reporting 
on NT’s 1941 Annual General Meeting, said that there were a number of speakers on the 
subject of the need to plan now for post-war reconstruction, and quoted Sir Lawrence Chubb 
(also active at a senior level in CPRE and NSAS) as saying: ‘while so much of the beauty of 
the country and town is being destroyed by Huns, we must be careful that its reconstruction 
shall not be conducted by vandals.’119  This translated primarily into seeking to obtain back 
into its custody those buildings and lands which had been requisitioned during the war, as it 
subsequently stated in its 1946-1947 Annual Report: 
 
The National Trust holds but a small part of the nation’s rapidly dwindling store of 
places of natural beauty and historic interest, and the Council is determined to resist 
all attempts to encroach upon that precious store… during the war the National Trust 
obviously had to subordinate its own interests to the needs of the war, but the Council 
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feel that the time has now come when National Trust properties must be returned to 
their proper use120 
 
Similarly, CPRE, having by mid-1942 spent six years in the long war already, was looking 
forwards as much as it was operating in the present.  In customary forthright tone it had 
enunciated its position in 1942:  
 
…let it be emphasised that while the first preoccupation of the British people is to win 
the war and remove the menace created by the Axis powers, some thought must be 
spared for peace when victory has been won…if we are to be ready for peace it is of 
paramount importance that we should be ready with plans and the machinery for 
converting those plans into reality. The building of new houses, the rebuilding of our 
cities, the establishment of national parks…and the needs of agriculture, afforestation 
and industry all require some portion of our England. No longer must our best 
agricultural land be filched from us by industry, housing and public works.121 
 
For CPRE, with a wider remit potentially covering any rural landscape, particularly that with 
an agricultural value, its concern grew parallel to the successful prosecution of the war and 
the prospect of requisitioned land no longer being needed for its war-time purpose.  By early 
1944 CPRE was aware that the President of the Board of Trade was interviewing possible 
purchasers of war-time factories;122 it feared that bargains might be made between the Board 
of Trade and employers without proper consultation with the still relatively new Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning, and it was CPRE’s view that the Ministry and local planning 
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authorities should be consulted in every case.  Such was the significance of the issue that it 
established a monthly sub-committee just to focus on the reinstatement of requisitioned land.  
CPRE estimated that the Government would have approximately 1,000 modern factories, the 
majority in rural areas, to potentially turn over to industry at the end of the war (and perhaps 
some sooner),123 in addition to military sites. 
 
The issue of the post-war fate of requisitioned land came to a head in the form of the 
Requisitioned Land and War Works Bill, which became an Act of Parliament in 1945 ‘to 
authorise the acquisition of certain land used or dealt with for war purposes.’124  Neither 
CPRE nor NT felt the original bill provided for sufficient safeguards, as it allowed the 
Government to retain requisitioned land which had been damaged by war usage where 
reinstatement would be hazardous and costly, and as there was very little requisitioned land 
that had not been damaged or on which some buildings had not been erected, the Bill 
effectively allowed the Government to retain whatever land it wanted.125  As befitting its 
preferred modus operandi, senior representatives of NT had undertaken confidential 
negotiations with the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer about the issue in 1943, 
before the drafting of the bill, but without much to show for their efforts.    
 
CPRE was not so constrained, and went public in January 1945 with its concerns through its 
press ally, The Times, complaining that the Bill lacked the facility for sufficient parliamentary 
oversight over the actions of Ministers operating the proposed powers.126  Abercrombie, 
newly knighted in the New Year Honours list, weighed in a few weeks later via the same 
mechanism, criticising the complete lack of reference to town and country planning, and 
                                                 
123 CPRE War-time progress report, October 1943- October 1944, p.8 
124 Legislation Gov. UK online resource 
125 J. Childs, The Military Use Of Land: a history of the defence estate, (Peter Lang 1998),  p.195 
126 The Times, ‘Requisitioned Land,’ 19/1/1945, p. 5 
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raising the spectre of the 800,000 acres of agricultural land that had been requisitioned for 
non-farming use in war-time being sold off for non-agricultural use because it would fetch a 
higher price, thereby allowing industrial spread into rural areas.127 
 
A period of intense lobbying followed in the first half of 1945, with CPRE using its 
supportive MPs on the Parliamentary Amenities Group to table a number of amendments, and 
by June CPRE was able to report that the Bill had been ‘substantially amended…and much 
improved from the CPRE point of view and is as good as could be expected in the 
circumstances which prevailed.’128  Sir Lawrence Chubb added at the Executive Committee’s 
meeting that month that CPRE had also secured ‘a definite locus for… [itself]…and other 
bodies to appear before the War Works Commission in support of any opposition.’129  This 
was a further step for CPRE in the direction of becoming an acknowledged stakeholder 
within Whitehall, and illustrative of the war-time period as representing a particular phase in 
CPRE’s existence (Chapter Five, p.114, below).  
 
The above consideration of areas of opposition to certain consequences of the State’s war 
effort shows us two key inter-related features of the organisations’ relationship with the State.  
Firstly, that there was a preparedness to oppose the Government on issues that organisations 
felt were central to their concerns; secondly, that when these organisations set themselves in 
direct opposition to the war-time Coalition Government they did not secure any significant 
concessions; in both the cases of NSAS’ opposition to the policy of deliberate smoke 
production, and CPRE’s opposition to the seaplane factory at Calgarth, the two organisations 
invested a considerable amount of lobbying capital in opposing the State’s intentions, but the 
issues were felt by the State to be centrally supportive to their conduct the war.  However, 
                                                 
127 The Times, ‘Requisitioned Land,’ 31/1/1945, p. 5 
128 CPRE Quarterly Report, June 1945, p.4 
129 CPRE EC Minutes, 12/6/1945, (MERL SR CPRE A/1/6), ‘Requisitioned Land & War Works Bill’ 
108 
 
CPRE’s standing in government was not harmed by its expenditure of a great deal of political 
capital over this issue for much of the war, together with its thorny opposition to the post-war 
settlement initially proposed by the Coalition Government with regard to the ownership and 
compensation package for war-time land requisitions.  I would argue that this was because 
support for it was so strong with public and private supporters within politics and the civil 
service that this insulated it from falling out of favour at times when it was most oppositional. 
 
In its 1946 Annual Report CPRE summarised retrospectively the impact of the war on 
Britain’s environment and landscape; it was however taken almost word-for-word from its 
1942-1943 War-time Progress Report (p.84 above), suggesting that its original war-time 
analysis remained an accurate assessment of the loss and profit account as it affected the 
environment and landscape.  Whether new or recycled words, Britain’s rural environment and 
landscape had been transformed over the long war period of 1936 to 1946.   
 
This chapter has demonstrated that organisations acquiesced to significant levels of 
environmental damage and changes to landscape if it was felt that this was an inevitable and 
necessary consequence of the war effort, although capacity issues were also significant, 
particularly for PRS.  This acquiescence was rarely unequivocal however, as CPRE’s 
resistance to continued tree-felling in prime amenity areas in the latter stages of the war, and 
the inadequacies of restoration of land after its use for open-cast mining, show.  As noted 
above [page reference] when organisations undertook outright opposition they did not secure 
any significant concessions.  Organisations were more successful where they could make 
suggestions about alternative sites, as CPRE did on numerous occasions where agricultural 
land was in danger of being requisitioned by Defence Departments, or industry and business 
sought to consolidate their temporary locations in rural areas beyond the war-time period.   
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The war also had a transforming impact on the future direction of both CPRE and NT.  War, 
or specifically, the need to be more self-sufficient in food, attached a strategic importance and 
economic value to land which had been absent since the First World War, which was entirely 
consistent with CPRE’s aspirations for the development of rural areas.  All four organisations 
instinctively and expressly supported the war effort, although for those with a capacity to do 
otherwise (i.e. all except PRS), not unquestioningly where war-related activities ran up 
against certain “red lines.”  The loss of land to the Defence Departments was to be opposed to 
a certain extent by CPRE if it led to the loss of agricultural land, opposed without hesitation 
by CPRE if it was in an area which had likely “national park” status, and opposed by NT if it 
affected their growing portfolio of land and buildings, itself an unplanned consequence of the 
war.  Indeed, this war-time accumulation of property was the Trust’s greatest war-time 
achievement, albeit an inadvertent one, and one that caused the Trust severe growing pains in 
the post-war period as it sought to reinvent itself as a more populist visitor-oriented amenity 
organisation.  The CPRE grew in influence during the war, to the point, as we shall see in 
Chapter Five, where it was enlisted by government to act as a conduit between the State and 
civil society over the Defence Departments’ ongoing needs for land in the emerging Cold 
War period.   
 
NSAS and PRS did not have the same good war as CPRE and NT.  NSAS did not succeed in 
its three-year opposition to the deliberate air pollution promoted by the Ministry for Home 
Security, but it was very quick to recognise the potential for achieving its aims and objectives 
through post-war reconstruction, and its standing increased both during and after the war 
amongst local government officers concerned with health and air quality.  PRS was 
overwhelmed and exhausted by the war, filing all its evidence relating to war-related 
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pollution of rivers and streams until after it had finished, and when the war finished, narrowly 
avoided being folded up when both the Secretary and President expressed their wish to 
resign.130 
 
The next chapter will look briefly at the legacy of organisations’ war-time policies and 
activities, using the example of CPRE to explore how war-time roles influenced post-war 
organisational development, and its relevance both in terms of the institutional history of the 
organisation and environmental history more generally. 
 
                                                 
130 PRS EC Minutes 18/4/1946, (FL PRS1/1/1), p.162 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Legacy: The Historical Significance of Organisations’ War-time Activity in the Post-War 
Period  
 
This chapter will briefly consider several inter-related aspects of the issue of “legacy”: firstly, 
to what extent an organisation’s war-time policies and activities may have had an influence 
on its future development; secondly, whether this period of work can represent a particularly 
distinct or notable part of an organisation’s institutional history; thirdly, whether these 
activities exist in isolation, as an historical snapshot, or whether there is a degree of 
continuity between what the organisation thought then and now; and lastly, whether any 
issues arise from this consideration which could be of interest in the broader field of 
environmental history inquiry.  In exploring this issue I will look solely at CPRE, due to the 
wealth of primary material that exists, including an interview that I conducted with Oliver 
Hilliam, CPRE’s current Senior Communications Officer, a member of staff of the 
organisation for the past 16 years.  It is also, I have to acknowledge, beyond the scale of this 
dissertation to consider the remaining three organisations. 
 
CPRE’s stock would appear to have been very high within the Defence Departments in the 
immediate post-war period, as a result of its engagement with these various government 
ministries over the course of the long war.  In November 1946 CPRE was invited to arrange 
for the coordination and presentation to the Inter-Departmental Committee on Service Land 
Requirements all of the evidence which voluntary organisations throughout the country might 
wish to give regarding the effects of the Services’ post-war land proposals from the point of 
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view of amenity, archaeology, natural history and other scientific interests.1  This led to 
CPRE having under review 433 cases in England covering 646,598 acres and CPRE Wales 
55 cases, covering 111,742 acres, using confidential material supplied by the Defence 
Departments.2  CPRE described it as having to work on: ‘an unprecedented scale and it is no 
exaggeration to say that it is at once the largest and the most formidable single subject with 
which, during this period, the Council has had to deal,3 and ‘a considerable number of 
proposals to which the CPRE or its branches took strong objection have been withdrawn.4  
 
For CPRE, the long war period represented a significant degree of interest-convergence with 
the State, and its standing in government circles benefitted from the generally constructive 
dialogue which existed between CPRE and Defence Departments and other government 
ministries with land requisition needs.  I would argue that this mid-to-late 1940s period 
represents a high water mark in the history of CPRE.  The point to which CPRE had come, as 
a trusted intermediary between government and civil society, should be seen together with the 
passing of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act and in 1949 the National Parks and 
Access to the Countryside Act, which Janet C. Dwyer and Ian D. Hodge describe as the first 
and second major pieces of rural conservation legislation in Britain;5 both were major 
elements of CPRE policy, which coincided with the relative enthusiasm in political quarters 
for greater state intervention in industry, agriculture, housing, energy, transport, education 
and amenities as part of the post-war settlement; an enthusiasm that CPRE had been active in 
underpinning throughout the war. Further, if honours to individuals are at least to a certain 
                                                 
1  CPRE Annual Report 1947, (Vol. XV, No.2), (MERL SR CPRE B/2/14), p.6 
2 Ibid, p.8 
3 Ibid, p.6 
4 Ibid, p.12 
5 J.C. Dwyer and I.D. Hodge, Countryside in Trust: land management by conservation, recreation and amenity 
organisations, (John Wiley & Sons, 1996), pp.8-9 
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extent a reflection on the organisations with which they are most closely associated, Professor 
Abercrombie was knighted in the 1945 New Year Honours.6  
 
Hilliam’s considered view, as CPRE’s senior member of staff responsible for the 
organisation’s communications, is that 1937 to 1938 was a period of particular strength for 
CPRE because ‘we were at full strength in terms of the Founder members being around,’ and 
that the war accelerated the pace of change in CPRE’s favour, with CPRE:  
 
…necessarily…[having to]…be quite opportunistic because they hadn’t quite reached 
their early goals of a fully democratic town and country planning system, national 
parks and green belts, so in 1937 and at the start of the war the founders saw the war 
as an opportunity to implement all those things as part of the reconstruction 
process…I think it showed quite a nimble organisation that could switch focus and be 
quite opportunistic to explore the potential for achieving our aims7 
 
Given this, CPRE’s war-time activities deliberately and directly contributed to the achieving 
of its mission in a period when change was much more on the agenda than in the inter-war 
period.  The war, and the immediate post-war years, are now seen within the organisation 
today as representing a specific phase in the life of the organisation, after which the infra-
structural needs of aspects of post-war reconstruction actually had a negative effect on the 
organisation from the late 1940s onwards; a case of the organisation being a victim of some 
of its own success.  The resulting success, by the late 1940s, Hilliam feels, presented CPRE 
with the challenge to devise a new focus: 
 
                                                 
6 CPRE EC Minutes, 9/1/1945, (CPRE HQ archive) 
7 Interview with Oliver Hilliam, CPRE Senior Communications Officer, 23 June 2017 
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it was no longer a visionary organisation…it became much more of a watchdog body 
which would oversee how the things that it had fought for were being implemented 
and being protected…1949 to 1990 is the more defensive phase in terms of getting the 
technicalities of the planning system right, and finessing the legislation that was being 
put in place, improving the quality, trying to stop the gains from being watered down8 
 
The irony of this is that professional planners were required to service the machinery of the 
1947 Act onwards, and a significant number came from CPRE’s own ranks, to the apparent 
detriment of the organisation.  In an interview given in 1989 by Max Nicholson, the former 
head of the Nature Conservancy during the 1950s, commented: 
the whole planning profession was set up in…[the]…1947 Act and put an enormous 
burden on that handful of people to create the profession. All that was a loss to 
CPRE…it really almost cut the backbone out of CPRE9 
The damage of this siphoning off of intellectual invention10 was compounded by, as Hilliam 
acknowledges, a definite dip in CPRE as the Founders died off,11 something that Nicholson 
refers to rather bluntly in terms of the number of obituaries in CPRE’s reports of the late 
1950s.12 
 
This increasing rural planning focus, with a regenerated agriculture at its core, is indicative of 
the convergence of interests that CPRE enjoyed with the State during the war-time period 
over the war-time investment in agriculture and re-orientation from pasture to arable farming.  
This convergence was dependent for its existence on the policy of CPRE at the time.  Stephen 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Max Nicholson, interview, recorded 1989, (CPRE HQ archive) 
10 Ibid, p.14 
11 Email from Oliver Hilliam/CPRE to the author, 20/6/2017 
12 Nicholson, p.14 
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Bocking asserts that ‘by the early 1940s, ecologists had concluded that most British plant and 
animal communities had been affected by human activities,’13 however, if there were 
ecologists amongst CPRE’s senior influential ranks who might have been troubled by the 
impact on bio-diversity of the radical transformation of agriculture during the war, then there 
is no evidence in the CPRE archives of their concern.  CPRE would not have its own 
epiphany regarding the threat to bio-diversity by agriculture until the late 1960s, after Rachel 
Carson’s seminal Silent Spring 14 saw ‘agriculture…restyled as an enemy of landscape and 
nature.’15 
 
Would CPRE policy during war-time have been any different if it had possessed a greater 
appreciation of the impact of the agricultural development it was championing, on 
biodiversity and flora and fauna habitats more generally?  Could it have led to the 
organisation being more in opposition to the State than it was?  Hilliam suspects that his 
organisation’s agricultural policy during the war would not have been that much different 
even given the organisation’s campaigns on the importance of biodiversity and habitat in the 
present day: 
 
I think that’s mainly because CPRE has such as strong focus on the national interest, 
so I suspect we would have conceded the overwhelming need to increase food 
production given the dire consequences if we hadn’t done that…[but] we [did not]… 
want to end up with Canadian-style prairie farming with huge machinery, huge fields, 
monocultures, so I think we would have tried to put in some kind of safeguards to 
prevent things spiralling…[out of control]… as we now know they did…we probably 
                                                 
13 S. Bocking, ‘Conserving Nature and Building a Science: British ecologists and the origins of the Nature 
Conservancy,’ Science and nature: essays in the history of the environmental sciences (1993), pp.89-114, p.98 
14 R. Carson, Silent Spring, (Houghton Mifflin, 1962) 
15 Matless, Landscape, p.378 
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would have insisted on hedgerow protection…we might have insisted on some 
protection for meadows and ponds…as unique characteristics of the countryside…and 
we might have…[proposed] field margins to protect wildlife.16 
 
From this we can deduce that CPRE would have been more questioning and demanding 
during the long war with regard to some of the consequences of the agricultural 
transformation that occurred, but because of its patriotic association with the national interest 
there would not have been a major opposition to it.  This suggests that whilst CPRE’s specific 
policies have developed significantly over time, the organisation that produced the Saint 
George campaigning postcard in 1928 (p.53 above) is still readily identifiable today as the 
same organisation, its depth of patriotism still capable of accepting the importance of an 
overwhelming national interest over and above that of its founding aims and objectives; this 
latter point, reflecting on the extent of compromise by environmental organisations in 
response to broader national factors, is I would suggest of broader interest and relevance to 
the environmental history discipline.  
 
It would be unwise to extrapolate from this whether the war-time policies and activities of the 
remaining three organisations in this dissertation represent a distinct phase in their 
institutional histories, or whether the consequences of their actions during the war had a 
subsequent impact on their post-war development, but the brief consideration of CPRE above 
indicates the potential value of such an investigation. 
                                                 
16 Hilliam, interview. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Conclusions 
 
Whilst the academic discipline of environmental history is a growing one, the role of British 
civil society organisations concerned with the environment and rural landscape in the 
Twentieth Century has not been well served, either in scale or by the degree of rigorous 
academic analysis. This is particularly true with regard to the role of these organisations 
during the Second World War, a time when the environment and rural landscape within 
Britain were transformed by the State’s preparations for and conduct of the war.   
 
This dissertation argues that the organisations founded in the inter-war period owed their 
existence to the heightened sense of identification with the countryside that the First World 
War had generated, the subsequent disappointment in the inadequate role of the State in 
defending the rural environment against pollution and changes in land use, characterised by 
weak and compromised legislation that successive governments passed, and the need, borne 
out of a new-found professionalism that was characteristic of the period, to form more 
effective and collaborative methods of working.  CPRE’s policy in this inter-war period was 
characterised by a growth-focused approach to rural society centred around agricultural 
development, and its campaigning activity reflected a patriotic under-current. Both 
characteristics would be significant factors in the balance the organisation struck between 
supporting the subsequent Coalition Government’s war effort and undertaking work in 
support of its aims and objectives. 
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The above work has documented the increasing levels of war preparations by the 
Government’s Defence Departments and assessed that these placed sudden demands on both 
CPRE and NT, beginning in 1936 and lasting through into the immediate post-war period; 
what the dissertation terms “the long war”. CPRE developed a set of criteria for dealing with 
Defence Department land requisitions requests which acted as a template for how it would 
respond to war-effort related demands on landscape throughout the forthcoming year.  The 
dissertation has identified that central to CPRE’s approach was a recognition of both the 
validity and necessity of the need for Defence Department war-time preparations, and the 
centrality of a rapid agricultural transformation to underpin the war effort; CPRE was able to 
accept the former because of its underlying patriotism, and the latter represented a very close 
convergence of interests.  Furthermore, the dissertation has exposed, for the first time in an 
academic text, as far as I am aware, that through its lobbying efforts, crucially aided by a 
sympathetic and supportive Prime Minister Chamberlain, CPRE achieved for itself and NT a 
vital consultative mechanism for discussing government department land needs related to the 
war. This proved extremely resilient considering the pressures that war-time government was 
under.  Thus we can see that CPRE and NT were strengthened at a time when their interests 
might have seemed most seriously challenged. Additionally, this discovery regarding 
Chamberlain’s role has the potential to broaden our understanding of a major historical figure 
from the Twentieth Century. 
 
The State’s war effort demanded that all four organisations take positions on what 
environmental damage and changes to the rural landscape they had to acquiesce to, and what 
they were obliged to oppose.  This work has shown that judgements across the organisations 
were made according to the centrality of the particular issue to the war effort, the centrality of 
the issue to the respective organisations’ aims and objectives, whether there were viable 
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alternatives, and whether the organisations had the resources to oppose if they so wished.   
The organisations did not challenge actions by the State where the direct defence of the 
nation was at stake, in the case of coastal defences, nor activities in direct support of the war 
effort such as munitions factories, the generation of sufficient timber, and open-cast mining, 
although exceptions were made with the prolonged duration of the war, in the case of the 
felling of woodland, and if agricultural development was diminished, in the case of open-cast 
mining land restoration.   
 
The examination of issues that the four organisations opposed the State on identifies two key 
inter-related features of the organisations’ relationship with the State.  Firstly, a preparedness 
to oppose the Government on issues that organisations felt were “red line” issues, and 
secondly, that when these organisations set themselves in direct opposition to government 
they did not secure any significant concessions, as the issues were felt by the State to be 
centrally supportive to their conduct the war.  Organisations were more successful where they 
could make alternative suggestions; this was most practically achievable on the subject of 
land use, suggesting other sites for consideration. 
 
All four organisations showed a great concern for the development and implementation of 
post-war reconstruction plans from the earliest points at which they were actively discussed 
during the war, borne out of civil society’s bitter experience of the post-First World War 
settlement.  CPRE became a recognised stakeholder by government, although this did not 
prevent it from being ignored by government if the issue at stake was felt to be central to the 
war effort.  The NT’s activity was severely restricted given its legal and constitutional 
obligation to focus on property it owned, but it was nevertheless active in their defence, and 
arguably just as successfully as CPRE, but in a less public manner.  NSAS sought to 
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ameliorate the impact of war-time industry on the atmosphere, particularly where it was done 
deliberately in the name of defence, but invested at least as much effort in seeking to position 
fuel efficiency as an integral part of the post-war reconstruction agenda.  The consideration of 
PRS demonstrates it for the most part paralysed by a lack of capacity, but in principle judging 
that war-time inland water pollution issues could only be addressed in the post-war period. 
 
Out of the four organisations, only CPRE could point to the war proving advantageous in 
terms of helping it to achieve its aims and objectives; war-time agricultural development 
transformed the value attached to land and provided what CPRE perceived to be a 
progressive force within the rural economy and society; furthermore, the political 
commitment to far-reaching post-war reconstruction delivered a network of national parks 
and a systematic approach to urban and rural land use planning, both also major planks of 
CPRE policy.  It is also proposed that NT benefitted from the war too, not at a policy level, 
but instead inadvertently, through increasing its property holdings as a result of the 
deleterious effect of the war on the land and property-owning class.  
  
This work concludes by disclosing that CPRE’s long war activities are now seen by the 
organisation as representing a particularly successful phase of its institutional history; it also 
exposes that this proved problematic for CPRE as it sought to transition into a different post-
war role, compounded by a loss of key honorary officers and members to the civil service, 
and a lack of succession planning.  The dissertation concludes by arguing that there is a 
continuity of values between the CPRE of the war-time period and the CPRE of the Twenty-
First Century. 
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Through its extensive and comprehensive use of manuscript sources this piece of work 
emphatically contradicts the unsubstantiated comments respectively made by Mandler and 
Wilt as to the status of CPRE in the 1930s and the level of activity of the organisation in the 
war-time period.  More positively and progressively, the material in this dissertation has 
engaged with a large number of existing  historiographies and contributes to their further 
development and expansion: the Second World War as a whole, inter-war and war-time civil 
society and the institutional histories of the four organisations focused on, the “Home Front,” 
the relationship between environment and war, the impact on domestic territory of a State 
waging war on and over foreign soil and seas, and the relationship between the notion of the 
rural idyll, patriotism and institutional duty. 
 
Generally speaking, the popular historical narrative of the British Home Front during the 
Second World War is one of dogged resilience in the face of the fascist threat, and 
acquiescence in the name of patriotism to every aspect of the Government’s war effort. 
Looking at the Second World War through the lens of environmental history has 
demonstrated that there were organisations that supported the war effort but also found ways 
of upholding their own interests in the face of it. The research is significant not only in 
establishing what kinds of activities were being undertaken in time of war, by organisations 
that we would now call “environmental”, but in its consideration of how both patriotic 
ideologies and pragmatic interests worked together to steer these organisations through the 
Second World War.  
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